

内容提要 ...

- ◆ 哥本哈根联合国气候变化会议充分表明，减少碳排放的问题面临着各国权利和责任不一致的政治问题。由于国际社会在这一问题上没能解决责权不一致的问题，因此推进控制气候变化进程受到严重阻碍。
- ◆ 气候变化议题在成为国际政治议题后，不再是纯粹的经济问题、道德问题和技术问题，而是必然会与国际政治问题复杂交织在一起，甚至将主要是一个国际政治议题。其背后体现的是大国的权力角逐，全球气候争端的实质就是国际话语权之争。
- ◆ 未来3年内，中国在气候问题上面临的压力将维持现状，不会有太大的改变。未来4-7年，中国面临的气候政治环境具有较强不确定性。未来8-15年，中国的减排成果将明显优于其他国家，因此在全球气候问题上的发言权将上升，将获得一定的主导性地位。
- ◆ 排放二氧化碳是基本人权和国家主权的一部分，联合国应对气候变化的战略必须以尊重一切国家的二氧化碳排放权为出发点，以构建公正合理的碳排放秩序为根本目标。解决碳排放问题的关键是确立责任与权利相一致的原则，减排标准要与人口规模、发展速度、技术水平、资金能力相联系。

建设碳排放公正的世界

导论：碳排放的政治化

气候变化正在成为国际政治的一个焦点议题。无论全球气温是不是像一些科学家所宣称的那样正在上升，无论温室气体排放与气温上升有没有直接而必然的联系，无论气候变化是不是真的对人类的生活产生了灾难性的影响，这一切都不是问题的本质。问题的本质在于气候变化已经成为一种引发广泛争论的国际政治问题，作为一种来自于人类社会之外的不可控制的风险，气候变化已经变得类似于核冬天一样的政治担忧。

一些人对它忧心忡忡，认为如果人类不采取积极行动无异于自取灭亡。另一些人斥责此种言论是杞人忧天，事情原本没有夸张得那么糟糕。有的人还没有意识到气候变化对他们有什么影响。还有一些人趁机鼓噪舆论，其目的源于一些不好明言的利益和动机。气候变化成为国际政治斗争的一个焦点。不仅以环境非政府组织为主导的世界公共舆论迅速抢占了应对全球气候变化的道德高地，甚至一些发达工业化国家也越来越瞄准这一战略支点，积极抢占舆论平台，甚至将气候变化作为谋求国际权力的工具。气候政治越来越成为全球化时代国际政治和安全领域中的重大课题。

气候变化政治化以后，和恐怖主义、核扩散、领土安全等问题一样，变成了各种社会矛盾如何平衡的问题，变成了各种政治力量之间的战略性博弈问题。此类问题怎么解决，将完全取决于世界各国的战略性互动，尤其是取决于大国战略走向和国际关系发展的状况。从内容上来说，世界各国对气候变化治理的分歧主要在于怎样才能达成一项有约束力的协议，要求各国主动减少温室气体排放，在排放峰值、减排指标、减排时间表等方面做出明确的限定，在此过程中，如何制定一项平衡各国利益的行动计划，如何平衡发达国家与发展中国家的权益、平衡大国与小国的责任，以减缓和适应气候变化的压力，是各国面临的重大问题。哥本哈根联合国气候变化会议充分表明，减少碳排放的问题面临着各国权利和责任不一致的政治问题。由于国际社会在这一问题上没能解决责权不一致的问题，因此推进控制气候变化进程受到严重阻碍。只有妥善解决好这一问题，全球气候变化的治理才能取得实质性进展。

哥本哈根联合国气候变化会议充分表明，减少碳排放的问题面临着各国权利和责任不一致的政治问题。由于国际社会在这一问题上没能解决责权不一致的问题，因此推进控制气候变化进程受到严重阻碍。只有妥善解决好这一问题，全球气候变化的治理才能取得实质性进展。

一、碳排放政治的现状

2009年12月7日-18日，联合国气候变化大会在丹麦首都哥本哈根召开。经过马拉松式的艰难谈判，联合国气候变化大会12月19日下午达成了不具法律约束力的《哥本哈根协议》。尽管《哥本哈根协议》维护了《联合国气候变化框架公约》及其《京都议定书》确立的“共同但有区别的责任”原则，就发达国家实行强制减排和发展中国家采取自主减缓行动作出了安排，并就全球长期目标、资金和技术支持、透明度等焦点问题达成广泛共识，但由于《哥本哈根协议》不具有法律约束力，在推动应对气候变化上的成效不会很大。

受国际金融危机的影响，自哥本哈根气候大会以来，各国在应对气候变化问题的立场和战略上出现了一些新趋势：早先充满乌托邦色彩的低碳主义路线逐渐让位于寻求国家发展和保护环境平衡的现实政治路线，让位于从国际力量对比和利益结构出发的追求可实现的利益目标，让位于寻求发达国家与发展中国家之间的气候共识。具体来说，主要体现在以下三个方面：

1、温室气体排放大国之间特别是中美交锋渐成气候政治焦点

在哥本哈根大会之前，全球气候政治的焦点集中在如何对温室气体排放大国进行道德讨伐，如何通过对温室气体排放大国施加压力来寻求达成国际协议。事实表明，此种不顾现实国际政治权力结构的乌托邦路线在实践中是行不通的，它没有充分考虑到温室气体排放大国在承担气候责任的同时所应当享有的正当权利和利益补偿。在后哥本哈根时代，尽管参与全球气候变化的行为体依然十分众多，但小岛国集团和非政府组织依然恪守乌托邦主义的极端立场，在实践中不具可行性，对气候变化政治进程的影响很难产生决定性意义，越来越多的国家开始回归理性，尊重现实，寻求可实现的气候谈判目标。近来的发展表明，焦点越来越集中于温室气体排放大国，特别是中美两国，而且这两国越来越成为气候谈判进程中具有决定意义的行为体，中美之间的交锋渐成气候政治的焦点。

发达国家与发展中国家能否在碳税、减排、资金和技术支持方面达成一致，成为决定墨西哥坎昆会议前景的观点，中美在气候变化问题上的交锋将成为坎昆会议的焦点。

作为当今世界的两大温室气体排放国，中美两国的态度和立场对气候变化进程越来越显示出攸关全局的决定性作用。自2009年以来，尽管美国在气候谈判方面一直力图打造所谓的“G2”体制，试图以中美协调确定全球气候谈判机制。然而，在政治立场和行动路线方面，中美之间却存在差异。中国一直坚持应该在联合国框架和原则下开展多边谈判，美国则采取削弱联合国的立场，把谈判重点进一步转移到双边或者经济大国论坛（MEF）等更有利于美国施加其影响的地方，引发西方国家向底线赛跑（race to the bottom）。当然，对美国的态度，欧洲也不满意，其环保和减排诉求被美国大大削弱。在2010年10月9日结束的联合国气候谈判天津会议中，中美之间的交锋再一次印证了中美在气候变化问题上的角力。

在天津会议上，美国和中国成为主角，欧盟、印度和其他国家的影响力大大下降。发达国家（尤其是美国）批评发展中国家（尤其是中国）忽视《哥本哈根协议》的政治共识，美国气候谈判特使托德·斯特恩（Todd Stern）明确指出，“发达国家做出绝对减排，而发展中国家只需要自愿减排”。这一言论引发了印度代表拉梅什等基础四国集团的反对，四国都支持《哥本哈根协议》，我们反对的是（美国）对其“选择性的阅读”和“误导性的解释”。“所谓平衡，即是发展中国家的减排承诺不应该比发达国家的更多或更大。”美国在推动气候变化谈判方面并非恪守与中国对话、协商和合作的立场，而是极力将气候问题战略化，使之成为抑制中国经济发展速度的战略筹码，这理所当然会受到中国和其他新兴经济体国家的坚决反对。中美在这一问题上的交锋还将继续持续下去。

2、发达国家与发展中国家之间的交锋成为决定气候谈判进程的关键

哥本哈根大会之前，发达国家之间立场并不一致，欧盟和日本比较积极，一直在推动气候政治日程方面不遗余力，美国则一直犹豫不决，在气候问题上迟迟不肯承担责任，甚至拒绝批准《京都议定书》。哥本哈根大会之后，尽管发达国家之间仍然还存在一些小的立场差异，但在气候政治化方面越来越趋于一致，寻求将温室气体排放与国际贸易政策挂钩。后哥本哈根时代，发达国家将积极或者变相推进碳关税进程，2009年6月，美国众议院通过了《美国清洁能源与安全法》。按照该法案，从2020年起将针对来自不实施碳减排限额国家的进口产品征收“边境调节税”（碳关税）。从2012年开始，2000多家航空公司被纳入欧盟碳排放交易体系。届时，只要飞机经过欧盟的天空，就必须为排放的温室气体付费。我国几十家航空公司均被纳入了征税范围。更有甚者，法国从2010年1月1日起，将针对法国国内企业和家庭征收碳税，同时还意欲借此推行碳关税。碳排放和应对气候变化日益成为发达国家构造新的贸易规则的借口和理由，甚至WTO也放风支持碳关税，说是碳关税符合WTO规则。因为世贸规则里面有规定，出于保护人类、动植物的生命或健康，避免对环境造成严重污染，节约可耗尽的自然资源的目的，是受WTO认可的限制贸易的理由。发达国家在征收碳税方面的立场趋于一致，在整合了发达国家政治立场的同时，也扩大发达国家和发展中国家尤其是新兴经济体的政治界限。

与发达国家相比，除了一些受气候变化影响紧迫的小岛国集团外，大多数发展中国家渐渐将注意力集中到获得资金援助和技术支持上来，维护发展权益和寻求资金援助和技术支持渐成发展中国家在应对气候变化谈判中的核心战略。2010年1月24日，中国、印度、巴西和南非“基础四国”气候变化部长级协调会第二次会议在印度首都新德里举行。会后发表的联合声明说，四国将继续推动在《联合国气候变化框架公约》下以双轨制进行气候变化会谈。声明倡议设立气候援助基金，以帮助气候变暖中的弱势国家，并呼吁发达国家尽快兑现援助资金承诺，以显示其在气候问题上的责任心，发达国家应尽快落实在去年年底哥本哈根大会所作出的在2010年为最不发达国家、小岛国和非洲国家提供100亿美元援助的承诺。在长期资金支持上，各方越来越同意设立联

联合国气候变化共同基金，包括美国气候变化代表潘兴在内，均认为设立全球气候基金是一条可行的办法，即便美国面临国内经济不甚良好的问题，也还是打算拿出资金来援助不发达国家，只不过不想发展中国家忽然抬高要价。4月9日，在德国波恩举行的新一轮联合国气候变化会议上，代表“77国集团和中国”的也门代表团团长阿卜杜拉·阿萨德强调，在未来的气候谈判中，必须维持和尊重《联合国气候变化框架公约》的中心地位；相关工作组必须以完全有效地实施《联合国气候变化框架公约》为目标，尽快推动减缓气候变化、适应气候变化、资金和技术合作等三方面的工作；未来谈判需要召开足够次数的会议并充分考虑发展中国家的意见。

3、务实路线渐成各方谈判立场的基础

哥本哈根大会之前，许多国家的立场十分激进，极力推动在哥本哈根大会上毕其功于一役，通过一项一劳永逸的有法律约束力的温室气体减排协议。哥本哈根气候变化大会以后，受国际金融危机的影响，各国的立场渐趋平和，务实路线成为各国谈判立场的主要选择。

欧盟的气候变化谈判立场趋于务实。2010年4月，欧盟提出了一项推动新一轮气候变化谈判战略。该战略的特点是近期行动务实，长期目标务虚。近期行动是欧盟坚持把温室气体升温控制在2℃以内作为目标，通过坚持联合国进程，与各国积极协商，筹集快速启动资金（2010年至2012年，每年为快速启动资金供资24亿欧元，）和长期资金（2013年至2020年），构建高效透明的监测、报告和核查框架，以及进一步推进国际碳市场等措施，推动《哥本哈根协议》的实施。此外，对《哥本哈根协议》中承诺的2020年前每年为发展中国家减缓和适应气候变化活动提供的1000亿美元（约合730亿欧元）长期资金的筹集提出了国际碳市场、国际航空、海运温室气体排放权拍卖所得和国际公共资金的三条渠道。尽管上述三种筹资渠道的有效性令人怀疑，但在加大对最不发达国家CDM的关注，强调将与美国等国家协调，推动CDM项目从单个项目模式向行业模式转变等方面，还是令人关注。欧盟委员会在战略文件中表示，希望在今年年底在墨西哥坎昆举行的联合国气候变化大会上达成法律协议，但同时又称，由于各国分歧尚存，欧盟委员会将为谈判“可能会拖延到2011年”做好准备。

日本政府强调务实行动，全力推进以低碳技术换取外国温室气体排放权的国家计划。2010年年初，日本以书面形式向《联合国气候变化框架公约》秘书处提交了减排目标，承诺到2020年将在1990年的排放基础上减排25%，且视为“国际承诺”。8月10日，日本经济产业省宣布，日本政府和相关企业将启动一项国家计划，向以东南亚为中心的9个国家转让最先进的低碳减排技术和设备，同时换取这些国家相应的温室气体排放权。

新兴经济体和发展中国家的立场也有所松动。以四国集团为代表的发展中新兴大国在许多会议上也多次表示，四国愿意在近期内就自愿减排的措施进行交流，希望“基础四国”不仅是协调谈判立场的论坛，也能成为有关国家就气候变化相关信息和科学技术进行交流的一个渠道。“基础四国”在2010年10月11日结束的部长级气候磋商中达成共识，决心促成一个“全面而平衡”的

坎昆会议成果，为未来的南非会议达成具有法律约束力的成果铺平道路。四国在联合声明中还首次就全球温控目标给出了全新表态，称将为升温控制在“远低于”（well below）2摄氏度的水平提供帮助。之前的四国声明中只提“低于”2度，而小岛屿国家一直在呼吁将目标提高到1.5度。

总之，在后哥本哈根时代，关于气候变化问题越来越集中在减排目标、碳税、资金和技术合作等议题上，有关各方围绕上述议题展开博弈。其中，发达国家与发展中国家能否在碳税、减排、资金和技术支持方面达成一致，成为决定墨西哥坎昆会议前景的观点，中美在气候变化问题上的交锋将成为坎昆会议的焦点。但是，由于当前正处于国际金融危机后的艰难复苏期，有关各方仍然在许多问题上难以作出实质性重大承诺，期望墨西哥会议解决所有的问题显然过于乐观和不现实。

二、减排争端性质的三种说法

气候政治化之后，围绕气候问题的争端已经不仅仅是气候问题，更主要的是一个国际政治问题。各种气候政治话语相互碰撞，大有愈演愈烈之势。然而，国际气候争端的实质究竟是什么？化解气候争端的出路在何方？这是走出哥本哈根困境的关键。综合目前国际社会对气候争端的研究，主要有以下三种说法：生存说、阴谋说和技术说。

1、生存说

气候变化问题肇始于科学家的焦虑，早在20世纪70年代，科学家的研究就发现，气候变化导致环境退化，将引发生态危机，危及人们的生存与安全。在环保运动等国际社会运动的推动下，这一说法逐渐成为影响广泛的全球议题，上至各国政治精英，下至普通民众，均对气候问题抱以强烈关注，甚至将这一议题道德化，成为对温室气体排放发动道德诘难的依据。

在生存说看来，气候变化问题的重要性主要在于其后果的严重性，它将危及人类的生存。大气中二氧化碳的浓度正在上升，一些物种因为气候变化已经灭绝或濒于灭绝。对于一些沿海岛国而言，全球气候变暖将使海洋水面上升，诸岛国面临领土减少甚至消失的危险，而且气候变化可能会导致干旱、水资源匮乏和洪涝等天灾，强烈影响各国的民生，甚至会引发“气候难民”潮问题。在此背景下，联合国难民署目前的主要工作之一就是考虑如何安置“气候难民”。

在“生存说”的推动下，由于气候与环境问题危及到人民的生存问题，这一议题逐渐从最初的科学假说转变为道德现实，亦即应对气候变化的目的在于为人类的子孙后代提供良好的生存条件。这一转变也是气候话语政治化的过程，人们已经不再关注这一科学假说究竟是不是事实，更多关注气候变化神话本身。这一神话使得人们想当然地认为，全球气候正在发生变化，气候变化危及全球各国，应对气候变化需要世界各国同舟共济，共同承担责任，做出一些牺牲，例如控制使用氟利昂等可能破坏臭氧层的物质，减少砍伐雨林等。于是，在“生存说”那里，仍需小心求

证的科学假说被当作道德诘难的前提，所有早先在现代化进程中被奉若神明的发展行为一下子成为饱受猛烈批判的对象，整个国际社会在全球化时代被气候政治话语再次分裂了：一方是积极追求国家发展权的温室气体排放，另一方是极力捍卫地球生存权的温室气体抑制。两派之间激烈辩论，推动了声势浩大的全球气候变化潮流。

2、阴谋说

尽管全球气候变化是一项公共议题，但国际社会对这一问题的态度却千差万别。其中，欧盟和日本的态度十分积极，美国的态度有所反复，中国、印度、巴西等经济高速增长的新兴经济体则极力维护自己的发展权，其他多数发展中国家希望从减排中得到经济收益，小岛国集团则表现出灾难来临式的末日情绪。对于各国对气候变化态度存在如此差异的原因，部分学者用“阴谋说”来解释。

“阴谋说”认为，所谓的“温室效应”和全球气候变暖，科学界仍存在争议。比如2007年3月，英国BBC发布的《全球变暖大骗局》纪录片中，多位科学家认为关于人类活动会导致全球变暖的说法是在制造不必要的恐慌。2009年11月，英国气候变化研究中心的网络遭遇黑客入侵，大量内部资料被公开，从而暴露了该研究中心多年来人为修改气候变暖数据的行为。2009年12月8日，俄罗斯科学院天文观测总台阿卜杜萨马托夫等近20个国家的140位科学家联名向联合国秘书长潘基文发出公开信，质疑“人类活动导致气候变化”的说法。2010年初，IPCC报告中关于喜马拉雅冰川的有关数据资料的错误被披露，使IPCC面临重大的信誉危机。基于科学界对气候变暖仍存争议，“阴谋说”认为，所谓的全球气候变化危及人类生存就是一种无稽之谈，是一种为了实现某一国家或者某些群体的利益、权力而制造出来的政治幌子，本质上是一场政治阴谋。

在“阴谋说”推动下，全球气候变化成为各种政治力量进行政治博弈的筹码，沦为各国之间争夺权力和利益的工具。比如有些人怀疑欧盟是利用全球气候变化打开全世界的新能源产品市场，怀疑美国是借气候变化转嫁国内的金融危机，《全球变暖的大骗局》的纪录片认为，“全球变暖说”是由反工业化环保分子创造出来的，其背后是一个高达数百亿美元的产业。一些发展中国家的分析家认为气候争端的背后隐藏着发达国家遏制和阻止发展中国家继续发展的阴谋，甚至有中国学者认为这一阴谋是发达国家为了在经济上遏制中国，气候和环保是遏制中国发展的重要武器。于是，在“阴谋说”看来，围绕全球气候变化的争论不过是“新瓶装旧酒”，各国的首要战略是揭穿其他国家的阴谋，尽可能在国家利益和权力争夺中获取更大的份额，全球气候变化闹剧背后仍然是赤裸裸的利益争夺和权力角逐。

3、技术说

在气候变化问题上，还有一种广受争议的说法可以称之为“技术说”。“技术说”认为，全球气候变化与温室气体排放有着直接的关系，要想有效扭转全球气候变暖的问题，国际社会的

最直接方法就是减少温室气体排放，而减少温室气体排放就必须推广绿色能源，推广清洁能源技术。基于此，“技术说”认为，在应对气候变化议题上，各国态度之所以存在差异，主要在于各国的清洁能源技术发展水平不同，清洁技术水平高的国家希望推广自己的新能源技术，清洁能源技术水平低的国家则希望获得现代化的“后发优势”，化石能源依赖程度高的国家则极力捍卫自己使用化石能源的正当权利。

在“技术说”看来，欧洲在清洁能源的技术水平上领先于全球，若各国支持环保力度越大，欧洲通过外销绿色能源设备和清洁能源技术盈利的空间就更大，因此，欧洲积极支持环保，推动全球气候变化治理议题。同时，在实行减排时，欧盟实行了内部减排成本分摊协议，并非每个欧盟成员国都要做到减排20%，其中，部分大国可以做得更多，为一些成员国分摊减排任务，这一安排也保证了欧盟作为一个整体能协调一致支持减排。而其他发达国家的技术相对较弱，态度不如欧盟积极。发展中国家的清洁能源技术又低于其他发达国家，对环保的支持力度最小。特别是新兴经济体国家处于现代化的快速发展阶段，对化石能源依赖程度高，清洁能源技术推广难度大，在温室气体减排方面最不积极。总之，“技术说”将全球气候变化问题归结为技术问题，只要技术解决，温室气体减排可能就得以解决。问题的关键在于如何平衡技术领先国对技术落后国的技术支持、资金援助与这些国家承诺温室气体减排份额的关系，如何实现发达国家与发展中国家的责任与权利的平衡。

4、既有观点的批判

以上三种说法各有其合理性，但并没有把握到全球气候争端的实质。近年来，全球气候变化问题之所以受到全世界的高度关注，且有关各方争执不下，决不仅仅由于这一问题事关人类的生存前景，也不是仅由于各国的阴谋，更不是完全由清洁能源技术所引发。

首先，生存说、阴谋说和技术说可以解释发达国家对发展中国家的态度，但不能解释为何发达国家之间也围绕气候问题发生了争端。例如，以美国为首的“伞形国家集团”也拥有较高的环保技术，美国作为霸主也有遏制中国经济发展的动机，然而小布什总统拒绝《京都议定书》，引起了欧盟国家的强烈不满，欧盟和日本在应对气候变化问题上的态度也不完全相同。几乎找不到在气候变化议题上态度完全相同的两个国家，都或多或少存在着自己的独立看法。

其次，以上三种说法更多从经济利益角度加以解释，这只能解释各国政府决策背后的推动力量，即与环保技术相关的企业和非政府组织推动政府决策。然而，各国政府在进行决策时，不仅仅考虑经济利益，更重要的是战略考虑，特别是从国际力量对比和国家战略全局出发，统筹国家利益的优先次序，不会仅仅考虑道德问题、经济问题和技术问题。气候变化议题在成为国际政治议题后，不再是纯粹的经济问题、道德问题和技术问题，而是必然会与国际政治问题复杂交织在一起，甚至将主要是一个国际政治议题。

第三，气候变化问题持续数十年，期间各国态度发生变化，最明显的就是美国在小布什总统

和奥巴马总统任内的态度转变，奥巴马总统一改前任对气候问题的消极立场，在哥本哈根会议上态度积极，而以上三种理论很难解决各国的态度转变。显然，全球气候变化问题之所以在近年来突然升温，不能不考虑这一问题的国际政治根源，研究者可能需要将其主要作为一个国际政治问题来考虑。

三、减排领域的国际话语权争夺战

作为一个低政治议题，气候争端在冷战后取得了世界的高度关注，成为联合国安理会讨论的正式议题，拥有类似于战争等高政治议题的地位，其真正原因在于，气候问题已经不再仅仅是一个科学议题，其实质已经深入到国际政治斗争的核心——权力角逐——之中。简言之，全球气候争端的实质就是国际话语权之争。全球气候变化牵涉到全球安全，故而该问题与生俱来带有道德伦理色彩。无论哪一个国家，只要是积极倡导气候环保的推手，就会在国际社会占据道义制高点，获得重要的软权力。

冷战结束后，软权力的地位日益上升。冷战的和平结束本身就彰显了软权力在当代国际政治中的重要性。在冷战期间，尽管苏联拥有很强的硬实力，在军事力量和经济实力上都接近美国，但苏联在国际社会缺乏吸引力和感召力，在民主、人权、社会福利、政府治理和外交事务等领域上屡屡出现问题，受到国际舆论的批评，国际形象遭到削弱，最终引发苏联解体。冷战结束后，尽管发生了海湾战争、科索沃战争、阿富汗战争、伊拉克战争和其他地区军事冲突，但这些战争和冲突往往是大国与小国间的较量，尚未出现大国之间的战争。软权力领域成了大国争霸的主要战场。近年来，全球气候变化问题由于涉及人类生存前景、经济和能源安全以及复杂的利益分配，越来越成为大国争夺世界软权力的战场。在这场软权力的角逐中，各国均想谋求赢得更大的话语权和更有利的国际地位，提升本国在世界上的合法性，在全球气候变化问题上呈现出不同的行为模式。

在各国围绕气候变化问题的博弈中，核心是关于话语权和国际合法性的争夺，是软实力的争夺。

1、美国：收复话语权失地

冷战结束初期，美国对环保话语权的需求不大。冷战的结束，标志着美国独霸的时代来临，由于美国经济和军事硬实力都是世界最强，软实力上美国的民主、人权价值观也受到广泛接受，决定了美国长期对环保话语权不感兴趣，美国的主要战略利益是维护全球霸权，寻找潜在的敌人。在“9.11”事件爆发后，美国一度认定美国的主要敌人是国际恐怖主义，美国的战略重点应该是积极发展壮大军事作战力量，发动反恐战争，营造国际反恐统一战线。这是美国政府在小布什任内对全球气候变化态度消极的主要原因。美国政府在2001年3月宣布退出《京都议定书》，其结果就是欧盟填补了气候变化领域的软权力真空。

小布什执政末期，美国霸权逐渐衰弱。一方面，全球金融危机和美国在伊拉克战场的迁延日

久使美国硬实力受损，美国急需撤军，恢复经济。另一方面，美国攻打伊拉克和退出《京都议定书》使美国受到世界谴责，面临合法性危机。而在2007年底澳大利亚宣布签署《京都议定书》之后，美国在发达国家中受到孤立。2008年12月18日，美国皮尤中心发布的《布什执政期间的世界舆情变化报告》指出，美国的国际形象几乎在世界各地均遭遇挫折。再加上2008年的国际金融危机更加令美国在世界上的形象受到损伤，美国面临着来自世界范围内的批评和指责。为了改善美国形象，重新确立美国世界领导力的支柱，奥巴马政府将注意力集中到了气候变化问题上，希望能够通过倡导推进全球气候变化进程，重新获得国内和国际的支持，重振美国在世界上的国际地位和话语权。在2009年的哥本哈根会议上，美国态度积极，试图重新掌握气候谈判主导权。

2、欧洲：谋求软权力制高点

在二战前的数百年间，欧洲一直是国际政治的中心。然而，二战结束以后，在美苏两极对抗的国际格局下，西欧各国沦为二流国家，作为美国的盟友，在许多国际重大政治事务上不得不附和美国，国际政治地位和话语权大大降低。冷战结束后，苏联对欧洲的安全威胁不复存在，欧洲对美国的需求也相应减弱。在此背景下，欧洲渴望恢复二战前世界话语权的中心地位，在政治方面的体现就是欧盟东扩，重振欧洲在世界上的影响力。然而，欧盟在硬实力方面上依然无法对美国构成挑战，美国轰炸南联盟和攻打伊拉克让欧洲认识到美欧军事力量的差距，此后欧盟将注意力集中于软权力领域。在软权力方面，民主、人权是美欧共有的价值观，欧盟另辟蹊径地试图在环保领域确立话语权领袖地位，这既能使欧盟对外获得国际身份和地位，也能对内促进欧盟协调。在欧盟进展缓慢的现状下，环保是各成员国内部团结的推动力之一。

为了寻求气候领域的软权力，欧盟积极推动国际环境保护。对于发展中国家，欧盟通过清洁发展机制和全球环境基金机制加以援助。对于中东欧国家，欧盟通过联合履约机制实行援助。对于俄罗斯，欧盟通过支持俄罗斯加入世界贸易组织以及加强贸易联系等交换条件使俄罗斯于2004年底批准了《京都议定书》。欧盟的举动获得了国际认可，被誉为“国际气候谈判领导者的角色”。这种对欧盟角色的定位表明，欧盟的国际政治地位将通过气候变化的国际谈判得到日渐提升。

3、中国、印度等经济高速增长的发展中大国：谋求发言权

气候变化议题与温室气体减排与一个国家的经济发展阶段和发展水平直接相关。由于碳排放量往往与经济发展速度相关，而发展中大国的经济增长速度大于欧美等发达国家，因此发展中大国的碳排放量必然上升。经济发展速度快的国家，自然排放更多的温室气体。经济发展速度慢的国家，在温室气体减排上的压力要小得多。在发展中国家集团中，经济发展速度不同的国家其立场也大不相同。以GDP年增长率5%为分界线，可将发展中国家划分为经济高速增长的发展中大国和其他经济低增长的发展中国家。

随着中国、印度等国家经济的快速发展，温室气体排放快速增长。据国际能源机构数据，中国在2007年排放的二氧化碳约60亿吨，占全球二氧化碳排放总量的21%，已成为世界上排放与能源相关的二氧化碳最多的国家。因此，中国面临着日益增长的国际压力。发达国家采取了将中国与其他发展中国家分开处理的方法，要求中国在气候问题上承担大国责任。例如，2001年美国布什政府宣布退出《京都议定书》时，其理由之一就是中国、印度等发展中国家没有承担减排义务。在2009年哥本哈根会议上，对于中国提出的国内减排目标，美国认为中国需要做更多，还要求中国将减排承诺纳入国际协议。

中国未来将独自面临更多的来自发达国家的压力。若发展中大国承担减排的重要责任，则必然牺牲经济发展，因此发达国家强调减排与发展中大国强调发展之间的矛盾将成为未来的主要矛盾。而与发达国家相比，发展中大国所需要承担的责任增加，但发言权却掌握在发达国家手中，因此中国、印度等国未来将会谋求与其责任相匹配的发言权。

4、其他经济低增长的发展中国家：搭便车心态

从《联合国气候变化框架公约》谈判开始，中国一直以“77国集团+中国”模式与发展中国家阵营一起参与谈判。然而，国家数量越多，集体行动的难度越大。随着气候争端的南北矛盾加剧，发展中国家内部的观念差异化也可能加剧。

由于发展速度不同，经济高速增长的发展中国家关注的主要是发展问题，而经济低增长的发展中国家则战略目标存在多元化趋势，不一定仅关注发展问题，可能更关注安全等其他问题，尚未意识到气候问题背后的软权力的重要性。而且由于经济低增长国家的碳排放量较少，受到的来自发达国家的压力较小，不需要承担多少减排义务。因此经济低增长的发展中国家从各自的国家利益角度出发，虽然也支持环保和减排，但希望搭便车，要求发达国家承担更多的责任，自身则不愿承担过多成本。

上述各个国家或国家集团应对气候争端软实力问题的不同心态，导致了各方的博弈，这也是导致气候争端迁延不决的重要原因。在各国围绕气候变化问题的博弈中，核心是关于话语权和国际合法性的争夺，是软实力的争夺。每一个国家都试图从自己的国情和利益出发，提出有利于本国经济发展和国情需要的气候政治话语，并极力说服其他国家接受和认同这些气候政治话语。究竟哪一种话语将成为应对气候变化的主导性话语，将决定着全球气候政治争端的未来趋势。

四、中国减排环境的变化趋势

尽管气候变化问题是一个国家软实力与合法性的来源之一，但各国减排政策的力度与国家战略利益密切相关。当环保合法性与本国利益相结合时，国家会大力支持减排，反之则不会支持。在哥本哈根会议后，随着国际金融危机后世界经济的缓慢复苏和国际力量对比的变化，国际气候软实力之争的格局将发生变化，中、美、欧等大国政治棋盘可能重新洗牌。

1、未来三年内难有明显变化

2008年，国际金融危机全面爆发，这次危机发源于美国的次贷危机。这一危机波及范围广，影响深远。2008年危机刚刚爆发时，APEC会议发布的《利马宣言》承诺在18个月内解决金融危机。然而，至今已过18个月，除中国等少数国家外，各国经济仍不见起色。在2010年7月的达沃斯夏季论坛上，大家讨论的话题仍是金融危机。可以预测，在未来三年，各国经济仍将深受金融危机的影响。美国虽然也遭受到金融危机的重大冲击，但根据美国商务部2010年10月29日公布的数据，美国GDP增长速度回升，美国今年第三季度实际国内生产总值首次预估值按年率计算增长了2.0%，比第二季度1.7%的增幅略高，可见，美国即将恢复。而欧盟所受的打击很大，至2010年，欧盟成员国西班牙、希腊、爱尔兰和葡萄牙等国的债务危机将使欧盟经济难以迅速恢复。

美国在金融危机和反恐战争泥潭的双重背景下，急需解决国内经济发展问题。2009年美国皮尤研究中心的民调显示，49%的受访者表示“美国应该首先管好自己的事情”。为了化解金融危机的影响，美国需要中国在国债等问题上的合作，因此，中美矛盾主要集中在经济领域，如汇率问题等，而在环保问题上，美国对中国的指责较少。而欧盟为了尽快摆脱金融危机，可能会寻求新的经济增长点，环保经济提供了一种可能的方向。为了促进环保经济，推动环保技术的出口，欧洲各国需要保持在气候问题上的合法性与道德制高点，因此，会继续推动中国的减排。例如，在哥本哈根会议期间，2009年12月18日，法国总统萨科齐表示，哥本哈根气候变化大会的进程正在受到中国的阻碍。12月20日，英国气候变化大臣米利班德在《卫报》发表文章，指责中方“劫持”哥本哈根气候变化会议谈判进程。然而在2010年，欧洲各国仍然深受金融危机影响，希腊在债务危机下濒临破产。此时环保经济远水解不了近渴，因此欧盟也需要中国的合作。在2010年4-7月，法、德三位国家领导人接踵访华，4月，法国总统萨科齐对华进行正式国事访问。5月，德国总统霍斯特·克勒对中国进行国事访问。7月，德国总理安格拉·默克尔对华进行正式访问。由此可见欧盟对中国的重视程度。

在未来三年，由于金融危机的影响仍然存在，而中国经济恢复较快，因此各国主要关注的问题是经济发展问题，需要与中国合作，中国在气候问题上面临的压力基本上维持现状，难以出现较大变化。

2、未来4-7年中国面临的压力不确定性增强

在未来4-7年，美、欧经济将从金融危机中恢复，同时中国崛起态势明显，西方既有政治上联合压制中国的需要，同时也有借助中国不断扩大的内需市场的经济需要。一些发展中国家希望增加中国在全球减排中的责任，增加对发展中国家的援助，另些发展中国家则希望中国为发展中国家争取到较好的减排待遇。因此，中国在这个阶段的气候问题上面临的压力具有不确定性。

中美在这一时期的减排矛盾可能受到两国政治关系的影响。自冷战结束以来，美国对华政策基本上是经济上合作但政治和安全上遏制。2014年后，无论奥巴马是否执政，美国这种对华双轨

逆向的政策原则不会发生变化。这意味着，只要减排问题可以做为美国压制中国的筹码，美国就必然会在减排问题上对中国施加压力。随着大国实力的消长，中国崛起呼之欲出。依据2008年数据，中国GDP仅次于美国与日本，而且在金融危机的影响下，2010年中国已经超过了日本，GDP位居世界第二。而作为传统霸主，美国的综合实力相对中国来说处于差距不断缩小趋势，中美实力对比的变化是中美结构性矛盾的根基。奥巴马入主白宫后，虽然提出了G2的说法，但从未放弃对华战略遏制，在台湾、达赖、人权等问题上，美国不断地向中国施压。美国国防部2009年度《中国军力报告》宣称：“我们将继续改进并完善必要时对中国作出反应的能力。我们将继续向中国施压，要求其增加国防开支、战略、计划和意图方面的透明度。我们将与美国政府其它部门合作制定一项全面的战略以引导中国作出选择。”2010年5月，奥巴马政府发布的《国家安全战略报告》也表示：“我们将关注中国的军事现代化，并做好准备，以确保美国及其地区和全球性盟友的利益不会受到负面的影响。”可见，美国对中国的崛起心存防范。

未来4-7年，中美结构性矛盾将加剧，中国与西方国家在减排问题上的矛盾难以达成一致，西方国家仍可能以环保为武器，从政治方面给中国崛起造成困难。然而西方国家对中国经济的需要上升，又需要加大与中国的合作。因此，中国面临的国际气候政治压力将是不确定的。

3、未来8-15年中国将具有一定的主导地位

在未来8-15年，中美实力对比将进一步变化，特别是由于中国目前大力发展的环保技术将于未来8-15年见效，中国有可能在国际减排问题上获得一定的主导权。

目前，我国正在加大减排的政策力度。我国十一五规划的目标是：2010年单位GDP能耗比2005年下降20%。2009年11月，国务院常务会议提出的目标是：2020年单位GDP的二氧化碳排放比2005年下降40%至45%，并作为约束性指标纳入国民经济和社会发展中长期规划。在以上措施下，我们可以预计在未来8-15年，中国在气候问题上受制于西方的局面将被扭转。同时，随着中国承担的责任增多，中国在气候问题上的软权力将有所上升，美欧将难以再保持其在气候争端中的制高点。

可以预计，未来8-15年，中国将在环境技术方面取得突破性进展，减排方面将取得明显大于世界其他国家的成效，因此中国在防止气候变暖的全球治理方面将获得主动地位，甚至有获得主导话语权的可能性。

五、建立公正碳排放标准的建议

排放二氧化碳是人类得以生存不可或缺的权利，如果全面禁止排放二氧化碳，人类也就灭绝了，更遑论人类文明与社会进步了。以限制碳排放为由，否定他国家二氧化碳排放权是缺乏政治合理性的，本质上是限制其他国家的主权和民众的基本人权。

因此，联合国应对气候变化的战略必须以尊重一切国家的二氧化碳排放权为出发点，以

构建公正合理的碳排放秩序为根本目标，在充分尊重世界多样性和差异性的基础上，求同存异，将长远目标和近期计划结合起来，将原则倡议和机制创新结合起来，将国家行动和社会运动结合起来，将尽力而为和量力而行结合起来，在耐心地对相关细节做好论证基础上，制定出可行性的约束力安排。这是走出当前气候变化治理困境，推进应对气候变化进程的惟一出路。

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1、排除低碳主义干扰，确立责权一致的原则

气候变化被政治化后，目前强调“绿色”和“节省”的低碳思想已渗透到社会生活的各个层面，成为一种国际政治中的时髦话语，甚至被一些政治力量鼓吹为强力推行以减少或控制二氧化碳排放为主流生活方式的“低碳主义”气候政治哲学。该哲学认为气候变化对人类社会的威胁是不可避免的，温室气体排放是加剧气候变化的罪魁祸首，任何国家都有责任和义务实施温室气体减排，任何不积极的作为都是一种对国际社会不负责任的行为。此种气候政治哲学片面强调从伦理价值和道义理想出发，对一切温室气体排放大国开展道义征伐。从1990年的《联合国气候变化框架公约》到《京都议定书》和巴厘路线图，一直持续到哥本哈根联合国气候变化大会，低碳主义在国际政治舞台上日益活跃。

然而，低碳主义忽视了世界各国的多样性和复杂性，没有考虑到国际政治中责任与权利一致原则的重要性，试图在控制碳排放问题上搞“一刀切”的强制措施，强制让国情存在很大差异的国家接受难以实现的强制目标，最终没有达到哥本哈根气候变化大会的预期目标。可见，全球气候治理进程必须排除乌托邦式的低碳主义干扰，本着尊重国际政治复杂利益关系的务实精神，为全球气候谈判进程创造良好的环境条件。

碳排放是人类生产和生活活动的必要条件，维持合理的碳排放是人类生活的一项最基本的生存权利，任何国家都不能以追求不切实际的减排目标为理由强迫其他国家减少碳排放。事实上，由于发展阶段不同，人口规模不一，基本国情迥异，各国在节能减排方面承担的责任差别很大。据统计，占全球23.6%人口的发达国家自工业革命以来的二氧化碳累积排放量占全世界累积排放总量的79%。即便是现在，占全球23.6%人口的发达国家年均能源消费占全球能源消费总量的64.6%，二氧化碳排放占全球总量的65%。因此，发达国家一直在侵占温室气体排放份额中本属于发展中国家的那份，在温室气体减排方面理应承担更大的责任，发达国家对于发展中国家的资金和技术援助决不是可以讨价还价的赠予，而更多带有历史补偿性质，是为占用发展中国家资源而付费，应该是无条件的。当然，在后哥本哈根时代，发展中国家也需要考虑发达国家的承受能力，将近期安排和长期需求结合起来，逐步获得可实现的资金和技术援助，来补偿在化石能源时

代的“后发劣势”，换取低碳经济时代的“后发优势”。

因此，长期积攒的温室气体排放责任不是一朝一夕所能够解决，综合政治可行性和应对气候变化紧迫性，最可取的是确立责任与权利相一致的原则，鼓励那些勇于在应对气候变化中积极承担责任的国家采取果断行为。对一个国家而言，承担的责任越多，采取的行动越积极，意味着付出的代价和牺牲也就越大，作为一种政治补偿，国际社会应该确立鼓励性的政治原则，承担减排责任越大的国家应该就是在全球气候治理机制中享有权利最多的国家，通过建立差别化的权力分配体系进而与全球减排责任体系相适应，通过创建全球气候治理机制将两个体系巩固下来，有步骤地推进应对全球气候变化目标的实现。

2、尊重各方碳排放主权，确立协商一致原则

全球气候变化是整个世面对的一项紧迫议题，有关各方应对气候变化的紧迫感也日益升温。然而，应对气候变化的全球治理行动却不可寻求不切实际的一步到位，只能从实际出发，从尊重国际社会多样性出发，在尊重有关各方的碳排放主权基础上，确立协商一致的决策机制。

尊重各国碳排放主权，是联合国气候变化进程的首要决策原则。气候变化是全球性的议题，但应对气候变化的全球行动却是以国家为基础的。在当今世界还不存在世界政府和全球公共权威的情况下，应对气候变化的任何政治协议都必须以尊重有关国家的主权为基础，在尊重国家主权与推进应对气候变化的全球行动之间寻求平衡。一方面，任何国家都决不能以任何借口回避自己的责任，对于逃避责任和破坏大会的国家要掀起舆论批评和道义的指责，各国都必须从工业化以来温室气体排放的总量确定必须承担相应的责任，在确定减排目标、排放峰值、减缓计划和资金支持方面做出合理的安排；另一方面，任何国家也无法承担超过自己能力的责任，只能从自己力所能及的实际出发确定行动路线，即便在国际社会的压力下被迫接受了超过能力的目标，其结果要么是成为根本无法实现的一句空头承诺，要么会引发更严重的人道主义危机。

协商一致，是联合国气候变化谈判的核心规则。从尊重各方碳排放主权出发，联合国气候变化谈判进程要本着协商一致的原则，建立能够为各方所接受的决策机制，特别是鼓励有关各方的自愿减排行动，努力汇集各方共识。在气候谈判中，任何国家都不能以应对气候变化为由推行强权政治和干涉各国内政，将对国家和政府的约束转化为国民的约束，侵犯他国民众的合理排放权。同时，在减排目标谈判上，要长期目标和近期计划结合起来，综合权衡各国减排强度和难度的关系，从各国近期可承受的实际能力出发，鼓励“小步快跑”而非“一步到位”，还要将意外事件比如金融危机、自然灾害等因素考虑在内，在减排指标制定上留有余地。因此，国际社会在达成协议时，要注意尽力而为和量力而行相结合，围绕各国提出的减排实际困难进行耐心的充分协商，不断增强互信，扩大共识。在此过程中，要坚决反对单方面征收所谓“碳关税”和“边界调节费”等破坏国际信任的不负责行为，为气候治理创造良好的谈判环境。

此外，联合国气候变化大会还应注意在减排责任上给国家“减负”，将国家无法承担的责任

交给跨国公司和非政府组织承担。哥本哈根大会吸引了成千上万的NGO和媒体，足见这些组织的积极性之高。联合国气候变化大会可以考虑以此为起点，赋予非政府组织以特别咨商地位，充分调动非政府组织、全球性媒体和科学家群体的积极性，支持各种形式的舆论监督和社会运动，形成对温室气体排放行为的强大舆论压力和道德约束的“软制衡”，将国家行动暂时谈不拢的问题交给非国家行为体去监督执行，效果可能要比强行迫使国家达成协议更好。

3、确立公正合理的核查原则，制定普遍接受的碳排放标准

人生而是需要排放二氧化碳，全球气候变化问题的关键在于确立合理的碳排放生产方式和生活方式。解决碳排放问题的关键是确立责任与权利相一致的原则，减排标准要与人口规模、发展速度、技术水平、资金能力相联系。那种追求不顾一切的奢侈排放，不顾地球承载能力而一味排放的人类中心主义，和那种追求不切实际的减排指标，忽视不同国家国情差异的减排“一刀切”和搞减排强行闯关的做法，都将不可避免地走向走入死胡同。治理全球气候变化和限制温室气体排放的核心在于确立普遍接受的碳排放标准，并建立公正合理的监督核查体系。

从《联合国气候变化框架公约》到《京都议定书》，从巴厘路线图到《哥本哈根协议》，以往的做法都过于强调温室气体减排目标、减排责任和减排步骤，忽视了治理全球气候变化最核心的碳排放标准问题，低估了世界多样性差异对形成治理气候变化机制的阻力，最终使得国际减排进展缓慢。要想突破目前的困境和僵局，今后应该把重点转移到抓紧制定普遍接受的碳排放标准上来，墨西哥坎昆会议应把确立碳排放标准放在第一位，根据这一碳排放标准，对各国所应承担的责任和所享有的权利作出原则性声明。

碳排放标准的确立是一个复杂的体系，要统筹兼顾，配套进行。首先，碳排放标准首要的是考虑人均排放标准，确保全世界的所有人口均享有普遍的排放标准，不能对部分国家人均排放形成歧视性排放标准。其次，在确立人均排放标准的基础上，结合一个国家的GDP增长速度确定单位GDP的碳排放国家标准。要求GDP发展速度快的国家与发展速度慢的国家拥有同样的碳排放标准，就像要求运动强度大的运动员与普通人的呼吸次数相同一样，几乎是不可能的。因此我们要以碳排放强度作为国家排放标准的依据，严格限制一个国家的单位GDP排放，但不能限制新兴经济体现代化发展的合理要求。再次，还要根据全球气候变化趋势的需要，结合各国历史排放责任，综合制定国家排放峰值标准，在规定的期限内实现全世界碳排放总量的减排和控制，逐步把限制碳排放纳入制度化轨道。

同时，碳排放标准的确立还需要与严格的核查监督体系相结合，确保全球减排责任落实到位。各国减少碳排放强度，依靠国际社会建立相应的统计、监测、考核体系。目前，国际上已经出现一些比较规范的用于温室气体核算的方法学和标准，比如《IPCC清单指南》、世界资源研究

解决碳排放问题的关键是确立责任与权利相一致的原则，减排标准要与人口规模、发展速度、技术水平、资金能力相联系。

所及世界可持续发展工商理事会（WRI/WBCSD）推出的《温室气体排放协议：企业核算与报告准则》、国际标准组织推出的《ISO14064》等。但是，这些方法学和标准只是提供核算的基本原则和原理，应用于国内仍需要结合具体情况具体分析处理，尤其是基本数据的确定仍需要有针对性的分析研究。国际社会应继续推进温室气体排放的可测量、可报告、可核查方面的研究，逐步建立一套系统及科学化的方法为各国的温室气体排放核查做出核算及报告，逐步将温室气体减排核查纳入制度化轨道。

4、探索气候治理的原则，确立气候治理的机制

在全球范围内，要达成一份限制温室气体排放的决议，离不开接受一系列对各国行动具有约束力的原则倡议。不过，这一原则倡议仅仅是限制温室气体排放的一般立场和态度，在缺乏具体适用条件的情况下往往难以操作。因此，联合国气候变化会议还需要在原则倡议的同时，加强气候治理的机制创新，在组织领导、资金援助、技术合作、国际救济和监督核查等方面不断探索机制创新，通过机制创新为治理气候变化和国际减排提供动力。

一是推动建立联合国气候理事会。主导全球减排进程的是一些温室气体排放大国，要在充分发挥联合国作用的基础上，推动建立类似于以大国合作为基础的联合国安全理事会那样的联合国气候变化理事会，各国以自愿承担的减排责任份额加入，并根据承担责任的大小分配理事会席位和职位，以体现权责一致的原则。在此基础上，设立非政府组织特别委员会，给非政府组织以特别磋商地位，鼓励国际非政府组织表达自己的声音，构建一个有行动能力的全球治理机制，负责全球气候变化框架公约原则倡议的完善和行动路线图的规划，并对各国的违反公约的行为采取类似于联合国安理会维和行动那样的维持行为，以此来克服因组织领导不力而导致的集体行动能力不足的困境。

二是推动设立全球气候变化公共基金。由于各国都会不同程度的排放温室气体，各会员国都应当从各国征收的碳排放税中按照人均消费额度提取一定比例，形成各国的碳基金额度，以自愿捐资的方式设立全球气候变化公共基金，根据各国捐资的额度确立特别提款权份额，联合国气候变化公共基金分配方向由全体捐助国根据一定的投票权集体投票决定基金分配方向。发达国家对发展中国家的资源援助也将纳入这一基金，不再通过联合国官方开发援助（ODA）的方式进行。

三是推动设立气候技术委员会。由于各国气候技术发展水平不一，且气候技术属于民间所有，政府难以对技术转让作出硬性规定。因此，联合国可以设立气候技术合作委员会，吸纳各国企业以技术合作为条件成为会员，设立联合国气候技术合作开发项目。联合国气候变化治理进程中的技术合作要确立“以减排换技术”原则，各国可以根据本国实际情况确立减排额度，联合国气候技术委员会根据各国的减排额度提供相应的技术援助，将企业开拓市场、联合国技术援助和各国减排责任结合起来，推进国际节能减排进程。

四是推动建立国际防灾减灾合作机制。气候变化不仅强调减排和限制，还要注重气候救济。

全世界每年都发生大量洪涝、干旱、飓风等气候灾害，联合国气候变化治理也要把气候防灾减灾合作机制作为一项重要任务。要配合联合国气候理事会建设，组建类似于联合国维持和平部队那样的联合国防灾减灾特别行动队，各会员国派出抗震、救灾队员，每逢国际社会出现气候灾害援助请求时，有联合国防灾减灾特别行动队迅速反应，整合各国力量用于防灾减灾。

五是推动建立国际减排核查组织。在联合国气候理事会之下，还需要设立相对独立的国际减排核查组织，由各会员国、国际组织和非政府组织代表组成专业化的国际减排核查小组，开展全天候减排核查和检测，并公开发布检测报告，为联合国气候理事会决策提供依据。

5、推动形式灵活的气候外交，确立广泛的气候共识

应对气候变化是一项千秋大业，应对气候变化和推行低碳经济涉及利益错综复杂，加之国际社会千差万别，问题爆发需要日积月累，需要解决的矛盾也绝非朝夕之功。尤其是作为经济发展速度最快的国家，中国在温室气体排放上面临很大压力。中国的碳排放量从2006年开始达到60.17亿吨，超过美国59.02亿吨成为世界第一，从1990年开始算起，在16年中全球碳排放量增加75亿吨，中国增加37亿吨，占一半，全部发展中国家一共增加54亿吨，16年来，我们新的增量占发展中国家的三分之二。即使中国的经济发展速度降低到年增长2.8%的增速，2030年中国可能117亿吨。这个数字将不可避免的要引起世界上的发达国家和发展中国家的注意。其次，美国、欧盟和其他小岛国集团将所有注意力集中到了中国，并且以道义指责、政治施压以及各种形式的保护主义措施等限制中国，令中国在外交上将极为被动。

存在矛盾和分歧并不可怕，关键是尽可能通过对话和谈判的外交渠道加以解决。因此，要大力推动形式灵活的气候外交，积极参与国际合作，与国际社会一起应对气候变化这一全球性问题，如参与联合国框架下的国际气候变化谈判、在各种国际场合阐明中方立场、与一些国家进行气候领域内的对话与合作，逐步达成气候共识。此外，还要以应对气候变化为契机，广泛提高公众意识，动员全社会的力量和资源积极参与，加速国民经济结构调整和优化，认识和培养新资源，形成社会经济发展的新切入点和新动力，进而把外在压力转变为内在动力，把挑战转化为机遇，开拓创新，强化能力建设，建设生态文明，提高国家可持续发展水平。

地球是人类共同的家园，气候变化与环境保护是全人类共同的课题。作为一个全球公共问题，应对气候变化的核心是合理控制碳排放的规模，而碳排放与经济规模、增长速度、发展阶段、技术水平、资金能力等有着直接的联系。问题的焦点不在于是否应该对全球碳排放总量进行有约束力的严格限制，而在于如何在各国之间实现责任与权利一致，在碳排放问题上实现公正的正当。因此，无论发达国家，还是发展中国家，要真诚地本着“共同但有区别的责任”原则，制定多样但合理的减排标准，从而建设一个公正的碳排放世界。

Highlights ...

- ◆ The United Nations climate change conference in Copenhagen amply demonstrates that the problem of carbon emissions reduction is facing the political problem of the inconsistency between countries' rights and responsibilities. Because the international society has not been able to solve the problem of rights-responsibilities inconsistency, the promotion of the climate change control process is being severely hindered.
- ◆ Having become an issue of international politics, climate change is no longer a pure economic, moral and technological problem, but will necessarily involve complicated entanglements with international political problems, and even become primarily an international political issue. Behind it is power competition among the great powers, and the nature of the global climate dispute is the struggle for international discourse power.
- ◆ In the next three years, China will keep the status quo in the pressure it will face over the climate problem, and there will not be great changes. In the next 4-7 years, there will be relatively strong uncertainty in China's climate politics environment. In the next 8-15 years, China's emissions reduction achievements will be greater than those of other countries, so its discourse power over the climate problem will rise and China will command a certain dominant position.
- ◆ Emitting carbon dioxide is part of basic human rights and national sovereignty. The United Nations strategy for dealing with climate change must proceed from respecting all countries' carbon dioxide emission rights and work toward the fundamental goal of building a fair and reasonable carbon emission order. The key to solving the problem of carbon emissions is to establish the principle of responsibilities-rights consistency, and emissions reduction standards should be related to population scale, development speed, technological level, and capital capacity.

Toward a World of Fair Carbon Emissions

Introduction: the Politicization of Carbon Emissions

Climate change is becoming a focal topic in international politics. The nature of the problem is not whether global temperature is rising as some scientists have claimed, whether greenhouse gas emissions have direct and necessary relationships with temperature rise, or whether climate change is creating catastrophic impact on human life. It is rather that climate change has become a widely disputed international political problem. As a risk beyond the control of human society, climate change has become a political worry similar to the nuclear winter.

Some worry deeply about climate change, believing that humankind will risk self-destruction if active measures are taken. Others chide such fears as unnecessary because things are not as bad as they are exaggerated to be. Yet still others seize the opportunity to make a public opinionuproar, calculating untold interests and motivations; climate change thus becomes some countries' political bargaining chip. Not only have the world's public opinions dominated by environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) rapidly seized the moral high ground of dealing with global climate change, but some developed industrial countries have also set their eyes upon this strategic fulcrum, actively seizing opinion platforms and even making climate change an instrument for seeking national power and even world hegemony. Climate change has more and more become a major project in international politics and security in the era of globalization.

Politicized climate change, like terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and territorial security, has become a problem of how to balance different social contradictions as well as a strategic game between different political forces. The resolution of such problem dependsentirely on the strategic interaction between different countries, especially the strategic trends of the great powers and the development of international relations. In terms of content, the disagreements on climate change governance mainly lie in how to reach a binding agreement that requires countries to actively reduce greenhouse gas emissions with explicit restrictions on emission peak, reduction targets

and timetable, and how to devise an action plan in this process that can balance the interests of different countries, the rights and interests of developed and developing countries and the responsibilities of great and small powers so as to ease the pressure on dealing with climate change. The United Nations (UN) climate change conference in Copenhagen amply demonstrates that the problem of carbon emissions reduction is facing the political problem of the inconsistency between countries' rights and responsibilities. Because the international society has not been able to solve the problem of rights-responsibilities inconsistency, the promotion of the climate change control process is being severely hindered. Only by properly solving this problem can global climate change governance make substantive progress.

I. The Current State of the Politics of Carbon Emissions

The United Nations climate change conference was convened in the Danish capital Copenhagen during December 7-18, 2009. After a marathon-style difficult negotiation, in the afternoon of December 19 the conference reached the Copenhagen Accord that is not legally binding. Although the Copenhagen Accord safeguarded the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" established by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, made arrangements for the compulsory reduction of developed countries and the voluntary reduction of developing countries, and reached wide consensus on key problems concerning long-term global targets, capital and technological support, and transparency, it will not have much effect due to the non-binding nature of the agreement.

As a result of the impact of the financial crisis, some new trends have appeared in different countries' positions and strategies toward climate change since the Copenhagen conference. The earlier utopian low-carbon line is gradually giving way to a pragmatic approach that seeks a balance between national development and environmental protection, to the pursuit of realizable interests from the standpoint of international power distribution and interest structure, and to the pursuit of a climate consensus between developed and developing countries. Specifically, these trends are reflected in the following three aspects.

1. The confrontation between big greenhouse gas emitters especially China and the United States is gradually becoming the focus of climate politics.

Before the Copenhagen conference, the focus of climate politics was in moral crusade against big greenhouse gas emitters and in how to reach an international agreement by applying pressure to these countries. But it is shown that this kind of utopian approach which neglects the power structure of international politics is not practically feasible, because it fails to fully consider the legitimate rights and interest compensations of the big emitters in addition to their climate responsibili-

ties. In the post-Copenhagen era, although there are still many actors participating in global climate change, the approach of the small island developing states (SIDS) and NGOs which still hold a utopian extremism is practically infeasible and cannot decisively influence the political agenda of climate change, and more and more countries have begun to return to rationality, respect reality, and seek realizable climate negotiation targets. Recent developments have shown that the focus has increasingly concentrated on big emitters, China and the United States have increasingly become decisive actors in the climate negotiation process, and the confrontation between China and the United States is gradually becoming the focus of climate politics.

As two big greenhouse gas emitters, the attitudes and positions of China and the United States have increasingly shown their decisive roles. Since 2009, although the United States have tried to create a so-called G2 system to establish a global climate negotiation institution through Sino-U.S. coordination, there are differences between the two countries in political positions and action plans. China has always insisted on multilateral negotiation under the UN framework and principle, whereas the United States has adopted the position of weakening the UN and transferring negotiation to bilateral or major economic forums that are amenable to American influence, thus triggering Western countries' racing to the bottom. Of course, European countries are not satisfied with the American attitude, with their own aspirations greatly weakened by it. In the UN climate negotiation that was held in Tianjin and concluded on October 9, 2010, the confrontation between China and the United States has again demonstrated the struggle between the two countries in climate change.

In the Tianjin conference, the United States and China were the main actors, and the influence of the European Union (EU), India, and other countries were greatly reduced. Developed countries, particularly the United States, criticized developing countries, especially China, for neglecting the political consensus of the Copenhagen Accord. The American climate negotiation special representative Todd Stern stated explicitly that developed countries should make absolute emissions reduction while developing countries only need to voluntarily reduce emissions. This view was opposed by the BASIC countries (China, India, South Africa, and Brazil) led by India, who claimed that they supported the Copenhagen Accord but opposed America's "selective reading" and "misleading explanation." "The so-called balance refers to the fact that the reduction promise of developing countries should not be more or greater than that of developed countries." Rather than conducting dialogue, coordination, and cooperation with China in climate negotiation, the United States tries its best to strategize the climate problem in order to make it a strategic bargaining chip in checking the pace of China's economic development, which is of course resolutely opposed by China and other newly industrialized countries. The confrontation between China and the United States on this problem will persist.

2. The confrontation between developed and developing countries becomes the key to the climate negotiation process.

Before the Copenhagen conference, developed countries did not have a unified position: the EU and Japan were more active in promoting the climate politics agenda while the United States was reluctant to assume responsibilities, even refusing to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. After Copenhagen, despite some small differences, they began to converge on the politicization of climate change, tying greenhouse gas emission to international trade policy, and imposing a carbon tariff gradually becomes the key strategy of developed countries. In the post-Copenhagen era, developed countries will actively or disguisedly promote carbon tariffs. The United States House of Representatives passed the United States Clean Energy and Security Bill in June 2009. According to this bill, the American government will impose a "border adjustment tariff" (carbon tariff) after 2020 on imports from countries without emission reduction targets. More than 2000 airlines will be incorporated into the EU carbon trading system from 2012, and they will have to pay for emitting greenhouse gases over the EU airspace. Sever dozens of Chinese airlines have been incorporated into this scheme. What is more, France will raise a carbon tax on domestic enterprises and families from January 1, 2010, and will take the opportunity to impose a carbon tariff. Carbon emissions and dealing with climate change have increasingly become the pretext and reason for developed countries to construct new trading rules; even the World Trade Organization (WTO) suggests supporting a carbon tariff, stating that it conforms to WTO rules. These rules stipulate that acceptable reasons for trade restriction include protecting human, animal and botanic life or health by protecting the environment and saving exhaustible natural resources. Developed countries' positions on carbon tariffs are becoming more unified. At the same time as they integrate the political positions of developed countries, they also widened the political boundaries between developed and developing countries especially emerging economies.

Compared with developed countries, most developing countries, except the small island developing states that are most severely affected by climate change, have gradually focused their attention on capital assistance and technological support. Safeguarding development interests and seeking capital assistance and technological support are gradually becoming the key strategy of developing countries in climate negotiations. On January 24, 2010, the second ministerial-level meeting on climate change within the BASIC countries (China, India, South Africa, and Brazil) was held in New Delhi, India. The joint statement issued after the meeting declared that the four countries will conduct climate change negotiations by adopting a dual-track system under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. The statement proposes setting up a climate assistance fund to help weak countries in climate change and calls on developed countries to fulfill capital assistance promises as soon as possible to demonstrate their responsibilities in the climate problem; developed countries should fulfill the promise of providing \$10 billion for the least developed countries,

small island countries and African countries made in the Copenhagen conference. On long-term capital support, all parties have increasingly agreed to the establishment of a UN climate change common fund. They, including the American climate change representative Jonathan Pershing, believe it feasible to establish a global climate fund; even though the United States is facing domestic economic problems, it is willing to assist non-developed countries, though it does not want developing countries to suddenly raise their requests. During the new round of UN climate change conference in Bonn on April 9, the head of Yemeni delegation Alsaïdi, who represented the "77 Group and China", emphasized that future climate negotiation must maintain and respect the centrality of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; relevant working groups must take the full, effective realization of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change as their goal in advancing the three areas of slowing climate change, adapting to climate change, and capital and technological cooperation; future negotiations must convene a sufficient number of conferences and fully consider the opinions of developing countries.

3. Policy pragmatism gradually becomes the basis of negotiation.

Before Copenhagen, many countries held radical positions, hoping to achieve a binding agreement on greenhouse gas emission reduction during the conference. After Copenhagen and as a result of the international financial crisis, their positions become more moderate, and a pragmatic approach becomes the main choice of their negotiation position.

The EU's climate change negotiation position is becoming pragmatic. The EU proposed a strategy for promoting new climate change negotiations. That strategy is characterized by an emphasis on short-term action and long-term principle. In the short term, the EU insists on the target of controlling the rise of greenhouse gas temperature below 2°C. It will promote the implementation of the Copenhagen Accord by coordinating with other countries through the UN process in raising rapid startup funds (providing 2.4 billion euros every year between 2010 and 2012) and long-term capital (between 2013 and 2020), establishing an effective and transparent monitoring, reporting and verification framework, and promoting an international carbon market. In addition, the EU has proposed the three channels of international carbon market, international air flight and sea freight greenhouse gas emission rights trading, and international public goods for meeting the promise of providing \$100 billion (approximately 73 billion euros) every year for developing countries in their efforts to slow and adapt to climate change. Although one can doubt the effectiveness of these three fund-raising methods, they are notable for more attention to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the least developed countries, the emphasis on coordination with the United States and other countries, and the promotion of the transformation of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project from a single-project model to an industry model. The European Commission expressed the hope in the strategic document that a legal agreement can be reached in the UN

climate change conference in Cancun, Mexico at the end of this year but stated at the same time that it was prepared for “the possible delay of the negotiation until 2011” because of disagreements among countries.

The Japanese government emphasizes pragmatic action in promoting the national plan of trading low-carbon technology for foreign countries’ greenhouse gas emission rights. In early 2010, Japan formally submitted its reduction targets to the secretariat of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, promising to cut emissions by 25% on the 1990 basis by 2020 and regarding this as an “international promise.” On August 10, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry announced a national plan to transfer the most advanced low-carbon emission reduction technology and equipment to nine countries centered in Southeast Asia in return for these countries’ corresponding greenhouse gas emission rights.

The positions of emerging economies and developing countries have also softened. Developing emerging great powers represented by BASIC countries have repeatedly expressed in many conferences the willingness to exchange on voluntary emission reduction measures in the near future, hoping that the BASIC countries forum is not just a forum for coordinating negotiating positions but can also become a channel for exchanges on relevant climate change information and science and technology. BASIC countries reached a consensus after the ministerial-level climate consultation that ended on October 11, 2001 that they were determined to promote a “comprehensive and balanced” product in the Cancun conference, in order to pave the way for reaching a legally binding agreement in next year’s conference in South Africa. The four countries have also made a new declaration regarding global temperature control targets in the joint statement, offering help to control temperature rise “well below” the level of 2°C. Previously they have only mentioned “below” 2°C, whereas small island countries have always urged to raise the target to 1.5°C.

In sum, in the post-Copenhagen era, climate change problems have more and more focused on the issues of emission reduction targets, carbon tax, capital, and technological cooperation, on which relevant parties are now staging strategic games. Whether developed and developing countries can reach a consensus on carbon tax, emission reduction, capital and technological support is becoming the key for the prospect of the Cancun conference in Mexico, and the confrontation between China and the United States will become the focus of the conference. However, because the world is still in the midst of the difficult recovery period after the international financial crisis and because it is still difficult for relevant parties to make major substantive promises on many problems, it is obviously too optimistic and unrealistic for the Mexican conference to solve all problems.

II. Three Theses on the Nature of the Emissions Reduction Dispute

After the politicization of the climate, the dispute surrounding the climate problem is not just a problem of the climate, but mainly a problem of international politics. Different political discourses of the climate are clashing against one another with intensifying trends. But, what is the nature of the international climate dispute? Where is the way out in resolving the dispute? This is the key for getting out of the Copenhagen dilemma. Synthesizing international research on the climate dispute, one can identify three main theses: the survival thesis, the conspiracy thesis, and the technology thesis.

1. The survival thesis.

The climate change problem originated from the anxieties of scientists. As early as the 1970s, scientific research discovered that climate change led to environmental degradation, which would trigger an ecological crisis, threatening human survival and security. Promoted by international social movements such as green peace and environmental protection movements, this view gradually became a widely influential global issue. From political elites to the general public, many people have paid close attention to the climate problem and even made it a moral issue as evidence for moral scolding against greenhouse gas emissions.

According to the survival thesis, the importance of climate change lies in the severity of its consequence—it will threaten human existence. The density of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is rising and some species are extinct or are facing extinction because of climate change. For some seaside island countries, the rise of sea level as a result of global warming means territorial contraction and even disappearance. Moreover, climate change may cause drought, water resources depletion, flood and other natural disasters, greatly affecting the lives of many countries, even triggering the problem of “climate refugees”. In this context, the main task facing the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees now is to consider how to relocate “climate refugees.”

Driven by the “survival thesis” which holds that climate and environmental problems threaten human existence, this issue has been gradually transformed from an initial scientific hypothesis to a moral reality, that is, the purpose of dealing with climate change is to provide good conditions for the existence of future generations. This transformation is also a process of the politicization of the climate discourse. People are no longer paying attention to whether this scientific hypothesis is factual or not but rather to the myth of climate change itself. This myth has naturally made people believe that the global climate is changing, that climate change threatens all countries, and that deal-

ing with climate change needs the cooperation and common responsibility of all countries making necessary sacrifice such as controlling the use of materials like CFCs (chlorofluorocarbons) and preventing deforestation. As a result, in the “survival thesis” a scientific hypothesis that still needs to be verified has been made the premise for moral scolding. All earlier developments in the modernization process that were once worshiped have suddenly become the object of intense critique, and the whole international society is being divided by the discourse of climate politics in the globalization era: on one side there is greenhouse gas emission based on the pursuit of national development rights, on the other side there is the greenhouse gas emission restriction for safeguarding the earth’s survival rights. The vehement debate between these two schools has fueled the powerful global climate change current.

2. The conspiracy thesis

Although global climate change is a public issue, the attitudes of international society toward it are very different. The EU and Japan are the most active, the United States wobbles, emerging economics such as China, India and Brazil try to safeguard their development rights, most other developing countries hope to benefit economically from emissions reduction, and some small island developing states display a kind of doomsday mentality of the coming disaster. Some scholars use the “conspiracy thesis” to explain these differences.

From the perspective of the “conspiracy thesis”, the so-called “greenhouse effect” and global climate warming is still disputed in the scientific field. For example, in a BBC documentary *The Great Global Warming Swindle* released in March 2007, many scientists believe that the view that human activities cause global warming is creating unnecessary alarm. In November 2009, the website of the Centre for Climate Change Research in Britain was hacked. The resulting leak of internal documents exposed the fact that the center had for many years revised data for climate warming. On December 8, 200, 140 scientists from nearly 20 countries jointly sent an open letter to the UN General Secretary Pan Gee Mun, questioning the thesis of “human activities causing climate change.” In early 2007, the data mistake about the Himalayan glacier in an IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) report was revealed, causing a major credibility crisis for IPCC. Based on the fact that scientists are still disputing climate warming, the “conspiracy thesis” asserts that the view that the so-called global climate change threatens human survival is a groundless fantasy; it is a political camouflage for the interests and power of some countries or groups. It is a political conspiracy by nature.

Driven by the “conspiracy thesis,” global climate change becomes the political bargaining chip for different political forces, and as an instrument for the power and interest struggle between different countries. For instance, some suspect that the EU is using global climate change to open

a new global energy market and that the United States is using climate change to divert domestic financial crisis; *The Great Global Warming Swindle* believes that the “global warming thesis” is created by anti-industrialization environmentalists with a multi-billion dollar industry behind it. Some analysts from developing countries believe that behind the climate dispute is a conspiracy by developed countries to contain and prevent their countries’ development. Some Chinese scholars even believe that this conspiracy reflects developed countries’ purpose of containing China economically; climate and environmental protection are important weapons for containing China’s development. As a result, according to the “conspiracy thesis,” the dispute surrounding global climate change is merely “a new bottle with old wines”: the first strategy of each country is to expose the conspiracy of other countries in order to gain a larger share in the struggle for national interest and power. Behind the facade of global climate change is still naked interest competition and power struggle.

3. The technology thesis

Another widely disputed view on climate change can be called the “technology thesis.” This view holds that there is a direct relationship between global climate change and greenhouse gas emissions. And in order to effectively turn the trend of global warming, the most direct method for the international society is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. And reducing greenhouse gas emissions requires the use of green energy and clean energy technologies. Thus, the “technology thesis” believes that different countries have different attitudes toward climate change because their levels of clean energy technological development are different. Those with higher levels of technology want to promote their new energy technologies, those with lower levels of technology want to achieve “late mover advantages” in modernization, and those highly reliant on fossil fuels try hard to protect their legitimate rights of using fossil fuels.

According to the “technology thesis,” Europe has more advanced levels of clean technology than the world average. The more countries support environmental protection, the more space for Europe to profit from selling green energy equipment and clean energy technology. So Europe actively supports environmental protection and promotes global climate change governance. At the same time, in the process of actual emissions reduction, the EU has practiced an internal reduction costs sharing scheme. Not every member state needs to cut emissions by 20%. Some big powers cut more so as to share emissions reduction. This arrangement can also guarantee the EU’s unity in supporting emissions reduction as a single entity. Other developed countries have less advanced technologies, and they are not as active as the EU. Developing countries have less advanced clean energy technologies than developed countries, and they have the weakest support for environmental protection. In particular, emerging economies are in the rapid development phase of modernization. Their high reliance on fossil fuels makes it difficult for them to promote

clean energy technologies, and they are the least active in greenhouse gas emissions reduction. In sum, the “technology thesis” attributes global climate change to the problem of technology. So long as the technology problem is solved, greenhouse gas emissions reduction can also be solved. The key problem lies in how to balance the technological support those with more advanced technologies will give to those with less advanced ones, the relationship between capital support and these countries’ promise of their share of greenhouse gas emissions reduction, and how to achieve the balance in responsibilities and rights between developed and developing countries.

4. Acritique of existing views.

The above three views have their plausibility, but they fail to grasp the nature of global climate dispute. The reason for high-level global attention to climate change and the accompanying controversy is not because this is a problem that concerns human survival, or it is a conspiracy of different countries, even less so a problem triggered by clean energy technology.

First, the survival thesis, conspiracy thesis, and technology thesis can explain developed countries’ attitudes toward developing countries, but they cannot explain the disputes within developed countries themselves. For instance, the Umbrella Group headed by the United States also possess relatively advanced environmental protection technologies, and the United States as a hegemon also have the motivation of containing China’s economic development, but President George W. Bush rejected the Kyoto Protocol, causing strong discontent from EU countries. The EU and Japan do not have uniform attitudes on climate change either. It is hard to find two countries with entirely same attitudes toward climate change. They all have their own more or less independent views.

Second, the above three views explain more in terms of economic interests, but this can only explain the driving forces behind decision making, that is, companies and NGOs related to environmental protection technologies drive governmental decision making. However, in decision making, countries not only consider economic interests, but more importantly strategic considerations, especially in overall planning of the ranking order of national interests from the perspective of international power balance and overall national strategy. They will not just consider economic, moral and technological problems. Having become an issue of international politics, climate change is no longer a pure economic, moral and technological problem, but will necessarily involve complicated entanglements with international political problems, and even become primarily an international political issue.

Third, the problem of climate change has lasted for decades, and different countries’ attitudes have changed during this period. Most obvious is the change between President George W. Bush and President Obama. President Obama changed the negative position of his predecessor and

was active in the Copenhagen conference. But it is hard for the above three theories to explain these attitude changes. Obviously, in considering the sudden rise of interest in global climate change in recent years, we have to consider the international political roots of the problem. Researchers may need to see it primarily as an international political problem.

III. The Struggle for International Discourse Power in Emissions Reduction

As an issue of low politics, climate dispute has gained high attention from the world after the Cold War, becoming a formal issue in the UN Security Council and commanding a position of high-politics issues like war. The real reason is that the climate problem is not just a scientific issue; its nature is deeply involved in the core of international political struggle—power competition. Briefly put, the nature of global climate dispute is the struggle for international discourse power. Whichever country, so long as it actively promotes climate protection, will occupy a moral high ground in international society, thus achieving important soft power.

Soft power is becoming increasingly important after the Cold War. The peaceful ending of the Cold War itself showed the importance of soft power in contemporary international politics. During the Cold War, although the Soviet Union possessed strong hard power with its military and economic power approaching that of the United States, the Soviet Union lacked attraction and appeal in international society. International criticisms about its problems in democracy, human rights, social welfare, governance, and foreign affairs weakened its international image, eventually leading to its disintegration. Although the world witnessed the Gulf War, the Kosovo War, the Afghanistan War, the Iraq war and other regional military conflicts after the Cold War, these wars and conflicts were confrontations between great and small powers; wars among the great powers have not occurred. Soft power thus becomes the main battlefield of great power competition. In recent years, the global climate change problem, because it concerns the prospect of human survival, economic and energy security, and complicated interest distribution, has increasingly become the battlefield for great power struggle for soft power in the world. In this competition for soft power, all countries want to seek greater discourse power and more favorable international positions in order to enhance their legitimacy in the world, with different behavioral patterns over the global climate change problem.

1. The United States: Recovering the loss of discourse power

In the early years after the end of the Cold War, the United States did not have a great need for discourse power in environmental protection. The end of the Cold War signified the coming of

the era of American hegemony. Because the United States possessed the strongest economic and military hard power and because its democracy and human rights values in soft power are also widely accepted, the United States was uninterested in discourse power in environmental protection for a long time. Its main strategic interest was to protect its global hegemony and seek potential enemies. After 9/11, the United States for a time regarded its main enemy as international terrorism and its strategic priority as military expansion, waging the war on terror and constructing an international anti-terror united front. This is the main reason for the George W. Bush administration's passive attitude toward global climate change.

At the end of the Bush administration, American hegemony was gradually weakened. On the one hand, the global financial crisis and the protraction of the Iraq War damaged its hard power, and it urgently needed to withdraw troops and recover the economy. On the other hand, the Iraq War and its exit from the Kyoto Protocol were criticized worldwide, creating a legitimacy crisis. Australia's signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 2007 isolated the United States among developed countries. Global Public Opinion in the Bush Years, a report released by the Pew Research Center on December 18, 2008, found that America's image met setbacks in almost every part of the world. In addition, that image was also damaged by the 2008 global financial crisis, and the United States faced worldwide criticism and condemnation. In order to improve its image and resurrect the pillar of its global leadership, the Obama administration focused its attention on the climate change problem, hoping to regain domestic and international support and reclaim America's international status and discourse power in the world by promoting the global climate change process. The United States was active during the 2009 Copenhagen conference, trying to regain initiatives in climate negotiation.

2. Europe: seeking the high ground in soft power.

During the several hundred years before the Second World War, Europe had always been the center of international politics. However, after the Second World War, under the international order of U.S.-Soviet confrontation, Western European countries were relegated to second-ranking powers as allies of the United States. They had to follow the latter in major international political issues, their international political status and discourse power greatly reduced. After the end of the Cold War, the Soviet security threat to Europe disappeared, and Europe's security request on the United States consequently weakened. In this context, Europe desired the recovery of its central place in world discourse power before the Second World War, the political manifestation of which was the eastward expansion of the EU in attempting to regain Europe's influence in the world. However, EU was no challenge to the United States in hard power, and the American bombing over Yugoslavia and the Iraq War made the Europeans realize the military gap between the United States and Europe. Thereafter EU concentrated its attention on the field of soft power. In soft power, the

United States and Europe share common values in democracy and human rights, and the EU also tries to establish leadership in the environmental protection discourse. This can both gain international status externally and promote EU coordination internally. Under the current state of the slow development of the EU, environmental protection is one of the driving forces for member unity.

The EU actively promotes international environmental protection in order to seek soft power in the climate field. It assists developing countries by implementing a clean development institution and a global environmental fund institution. It assists Central and Eastern European countries through a joint treaty compliance institution. It traded its support for Russia's entry into the WTO and the strengthening of trade relations for Russia's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2004. The EU's action was acknowledged internationally, reputed as "the leader in global climate negotiations." This identification of the EU's role shows that its international political status will be increasingly enhanced through international negotiations on climate change.

3. Developing great powers with high economic growth such as China and India: seeking-discourse power

The issue of climate change and greenhouse gas emissions reduction is directly related to a country's economic development phase and development level. Because carbon emission volume is often related to the pace of economic development, and because developing countries' economic growth rates are greater than those of developed countries such as European countries and the United States, developing countries' carbon emission volume will necessarily rise. Those countries with faster economic development naturally emit more greenhouse gases. Those countries with slower economic development face less pressure in greenhouse gas emission reduction. Among developing countries, countries with different economic development pace also have different positions. They can be divided into high-growth developing great powers and other low-growth developing countries by the 5 percent annual GDP growth rate.

As the economies of China, India and other countries develop rapidly, their greenhouse gas emissions also rise rapidly. According to International Energy Agency data, China emitted about 6 billion tons of carbon dioxide in 2007, accounting for 21% of the world's total, thus becoming the No. 1 emitter of energy related carbon dioxide. China is therefore facing mounting international pressure. Developed countries have singled China out from other developing countries, requiring it to assume a great power responsibility in the climate problem. For instance, one justification for the Bush administration's exit from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 was that developing countries such as China and India failed to discharge emission reduction obligations. In the 2009 Copenhagen conference, the United States asked China to do more than China's own proposed targets of domestic emissions reduction and required incorporat-

ing China's reduction promises into international treaties.

China will face more pressure from developed countries on its own in the future. If developing great powers assume the important responsibility of emissions reduction, this will necessarily sacrifice economic development. Thus the contradiction between developed countries' emphasis on emissions reduction and developing countries' emphasis on development will become the key contradiction in the future. Yet compared with developed countries, the responsibilities developing countries need to assume are increasing, but the discourse power is in the hands of developed countries. Countries like China and India will therefore seek more discourse power commensurate with their responsibilities.

4. Other low-growth developing countries: the mentality of free riding

Since the negotiation on the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, China has always participated in negotiation with the developing countries camp under the model of "77 Countries Group + China." However, the greater the number of countries, the more difficult collective action will be. As the north-south contradiction intensifies on the climate dispute, disagreements within developing countries may also intensify.

Due to their different development paces, developing countries with high economic growth mainly focus on the development problem, and those with low economic growth have plural strategic goals. Not necessarily focusing on the development problem, the latter may pay more attention to security and other problems, without recognizing the importance of soft power behind the climate problem. And because low-growth countries emit less carbon, they face less pressure from developed countries and do not have to assume many reduction obligations. Therefore, although from the standpoint of their own national interests low-growth countries also support environmental protection and emissions reduction, they want to free ride, requiring developed countries to assume more responsibilities without themselves having to assume too many costs.

These aforementioned countries' or country-groups' different mindsets and attitudes toward soft power in the climate dispute have caused gaming among different parties, which is an important reason for the protraction of the climate dispute. In the gaming surrounding climate change, the key is the struggle for discourse power and international legitimacy, a struggle for soft power. Each country, from its own national circumstances and interests, tries to propose climate politics discourse that is beneficial for its economic development and national needs and tries its best to persuade other countries to accept and identify with the discourse. Which discourse can become the dominant discourse in dealing with climate change will determine the future trends of the global climate politics dispute.

IV. Changing Trends of China's Emissions Reduction Environment

Although the climate change problem is one source of a country's soft power and legitimacy, the intensity of the country's emissions reduction policy is intimately related to its strategic interests. When the legitimacy of environmental protection conjoins with national interests, the country will offer great support; otherwise it will not. After the Copenhagen conference, as the world economy recovers and international power distribution changes after the global financial crisis, the structure of the struggle for international climate soft power will change, and the great power political chessboard of China, the United States, and the EU may be reshuffled.

1. It will be difficult to have obvious changes in the next three years.

The 2008 global financial crisis originated from the subprime lending crisis in the United States. This crisis has widespread effect and far-reaching influence. When the crisis erupted in 2008, the Lima Declaration released by the APEC promised to solve the financial crisis in eighteen months. However, eighteenth months have already passed by now, yet most economies are still sluggish except a few countries such as China. The summer Davos Forum in July 2010 was still preoccupied with the financial crisis. One can predict that these economies will continue to be deeply affected by the financial crisis in the next three years. Although the United States was also greatly impacted by the financial crisis, the real GDP growth in the third quarter this year has risen to 2.0 percent, slightly higher than the second quarter figure of 1.7 percent, according to data released by the U.S. Department of Commerce on October 29, 2010. Thus the United States will recover soon. The EU has been the most severely impacted. The debt crises of EU member states Spain, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal will make it hard for the EU economy to recover quickly till 2010.

Under the double contexts of the financial crisis and the trap of the war on terror, the United States urgently needs to solve the problem of domestic economic development. Opinion polls by the Pew Research Center in 2009 showed that 49% respondents believed "the United States needs to mind its own affairs." The United States needs China's cooperation in problems like national debt in order to alleviate the effect of the financial crisis. Therefore, the contradiction between China and the United States lies mainly in the economic field such as the currency problem; on the problem of environmental protection, the United States has leveled relatively few condemnations against China. But the economy of environmental protection provides a possible direction for the EU to get rid of the financial crisis and to seek new economic growth areas. In order to promote the economy of environmental protection and the export of environmental protection technologies, European countries need to maintain their legitimacy and moral high ground in the climate

problem and will therefore continue to press for China's emissions reduction. For example, during the Copenhagen conference, the French President Sarkozy remarked on December 18, 2009 that the Copenhagen climate change conference process was being hindered by China. The British Climate Change Minister Miliband published an article in the Guardian on December 20, accusing China of "hijacking" the Copenhagen climate change negotiation process. Yet in 2010, European countries are still deeply affected by the financial crisis, and Greece is near bankruptcy under the debt crisis. At this time the economy of environmental protection cannot solve these immediate problems, so the EU needs China's cooperation too. Between April and July 2010, three national leaders of France and Germany visited China, including the French President Sarkozy in April, the Germany President Horst Köhler in May, and the German Chancellor Angela Merkel in July. One can thus see the degree of importance the EU attaches to China.

In the next three years, because of the continuing effect of the financial crisis and because of China's relatively quick economic recovery, countries will mainly focus on the problem of economic development and will need China's cooperation. China will keep the status quo in the pressure it will face over the climate problem, and there will not be great changes.

2. In the next 4-7 years there will be greater uncertainty in the pressure China will face

In the next 4-7 years, the American and European economies will recover from the financial crisis; at the same time China's rising posture will become obvious. The West will have the political need of pressing China but also the economic need of capitalizing on China's continuously expanding domestic market. Therefore, there will be uncertainty in the pressures that China will face over the climate problem during this period.

The Sino-U.S. contradiction over emissions reduction may be influenced by the two countries' political relationship. Since the end of the Cold War, American policy toward China has basically been characterized by cooperation in the economic field and containment in the political and security fields. This dual track policy will not change in principle after 2014 whether or not Obama will be reelected. This means that so long as the problem of emissions reduction can become the political bargaining chip for the United States to press China, the United States will apply pressure to China over the climate problem. China's rise is vividly portrayed by the changing power balance among the great powers. According to 2008 data, China's GDP is second only to that of the United States and Japan, and under the impact of the financial crisis, China has already surpassed Japan to become the world's second largest economy in terms of GDP. And as the traditional hegemon, the comprehensive power of the United States is declining relative to China, and the change in Sino-U.S. power balance is the basis of the Sino-U.S. structural contradiction. Although Obama proposed the idea of G2 after winning the White House, he never abandoned strategic containment toward

China. The United States continuously presses China over problems such as Taiwan, the Dalai Lama, and human rights. The U.S. Department of Defense Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2009 report declares that "we will continue to improve and perfect capabilities in reacting to China when necessary. We will continue to press China, requiring it to increase transparency in its defense budget, strategy, planning and intentions. We will cooperate with other departments of the United States government in devising a comprehensive strategy to orient China to make choice." In May 2010, the National Security Strategy released by the Obama administration also stated that "we will pay attention to China's military modernization and get prepared, so as to prevent the United States and its regional and global allies from negative influences." Thus, the United States is wary about China's rise.

In the next 4-7 years, the Sino-U.S. structural contradiction will intensify. It will be difficult for China and the West to reach consensus on emissions reduction. Western countries may make troubles for China's rise politically by using environmental protection as a weapon. But their economic needs on China will also rise, as is the need for more cooperation with China. Therefore, the international climate politics pressure China will face is uncertain.

3. In the next 8-15 years China will possess some dominant position

In the next 8-15 years, the power balance between China and the United States will further change. In particular, because China's environmental technology currently being vigorously promoted will have an effect in the next 8-15 years, China may command a certain dominant position over the international emissions reduction problem.

Currently China is intensifying emissions reduction policies. The goal of the eleventh five year plan is to reduce the energy consumption of per unit GDP in 2010 by 20% from the 2005 level. The November 2009 State Council Standing Committee meeting put forward the target of reducing carbon dioxide emissions per unit GDP by 40-50% in 2020 from the 2005 level and incorporated this as an obligatory target into the mid-long term plan of national economic and social development. With these measures, Western constraints on China over the climate problem can be expected to change in the next 8-15 years. At the same time, as China assumes more responsibilities, China's soft power over the climate problem will have some increase, and it would be difficult for the United States and Europe to maintain their commanding position in the climate dispute.

It can be expected that in the next 8-15 years, China will make breakthroughs in environmental protection technologies and will make markedly greater achievements in emissions reduction than those of other countries. Therefore China will gain initiative in the global governance to prevent global warming and may even possess discourse dominance.

V. Suggestions on Constructing a Fair Carbon Emissions Standard

Emitting carbon dioxide is an indispensable right for human existence. Fully forbidding carbon dioxide emissions will extinguish humanity, let alone the progress of human civilization and society. Denying other countries' carbon dioxide emission rights in the name of restricting carbon emissions lacks political rationality, whose nature is to restrict other countries' sovereignty and the basic human rights of other countries' citizens.

Therefore, the UN strategy for dealing with climate change must proceed from respecting the reasonable carbon dioxide emission rights of all countries and work toward the fundamental goal of constructing a fair and reasonable order of carbon emissions. On the basis of fully respecting the world's diversities and differences, seeking common grounds while preserving differences, and patiently demonstrating the relevant details, the UN need to devise a feasible binding arrangement by combining long-term objectives with short-plan plans, principle promotions with institutional innovations, national actions with social movements, and doing the best with doing according to capabilities. This is the only way for getting out of current difficulties of climate change governance and promoting the process of dealing with climate change.

1. Firmly excluding all kinds of disturbances of low-carbonism and establishing the basic principle of responsibilities-rights consistency.

After the politicization of climate change, the low-carbon idea that emphasizes "green" and "economization" has penetrated every dimension of social life, becoming a fashionable discourse in international politics. It has even been promoted by some political forces as a "low-carbonist" philosophy of climate politics that takes the forceful reduction or control of carbon dioxide emissions as the mainstream lifestyle. This philosophy holds that the threat of climate change to human society is unavoidable, greenhouse gas emission is the foremost culprit for intensifying climate change, every country has a responsibility and obligation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and all inactive behavior is irresponsible behavior to the international society. This philosophy of climate politics wages moral crusades against big greenhouse gas emitters by partially emphasizing ethical principles and moral ideals. Low-carbonism is becoming increasingly active in international politics from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1990 to the Kyoto Protocol and the Bali Road Map and continuing onto the Copenhagen conference.

However, low-carbonism overlooks the diversity and complexity of different countries in the world and fails to consider the importance of the fundamental principle of responsibilities-rights consistency in international politics, trying to impose undifferentiated coercive measures on carbon

emissions reduction, forcing countries with great differences in national circumstances to accept hard-to-realize coercive targets, eventually failing to reach the expected goals of the Copenhagen conference. Thus, the global climate governance process must be premised on excluding all kinds of low-carbonism and create a favorable environment by trying the best to exclude the disturbance of the utopianism of low-carbonism and by adopting a pragmatic spirit of respecting the complicated interest relationships of international politics.

Carbon emission is a necessary condition for human production and life. Maintaining reasonable carbon emission is a most basic right of survival of human life. No country can force other countries to reduce carbon emissions in the pretext of pursuing unrealistic reduction targets. In fact, due to the differences in development phase, population scale, and basic national circumstances, there are great differences in the responsibilities that each country need to assume in energy saving and reduction. The cumulative carbon dioxide emission volume of developed countries with 23.6 percent of the world's population accounts for 79 percent of the world's total emission since the industrial revolution. Even now, the annual energy consumption of developed countries with 23.6 percent of the world's population accounts for 64.6 percent of the world's total energy consumption, and the consequent figure for carbon dioxide emission is 65 percent. Therefore, developed countries have always been seizing the share of greenhouse gas emission that should have belonged to developing countries and thus need to assume great responsibilities in greenhouse gas emission reduction. The capital and technological assistance developed countries give to developing countries is never a negotiable gift, but comes with the nature of historical compensation as a payment for seizing the resources of developing countries, and thus should be unconditional. Of course, in the post-Copenhagen era, developing countries also need to consider developed countries' capabilities of support, combine short-term arrangement with long-term needs, and gradually achieve realizable capital and technological assistance, in order to make up for the "late mover disadvantage" in the era of fossil fuels and to get "late mover advantage" in return.

Therefore, the long accumulated responsibility of greenhouse gas emission cannot be solved in one day. Given the political feasibility and the urgency to deal with climate change, the most advisable is to establish the principle of the consistency between responsibilities and rights and encourage those countries resolute enough to actively assume responsibilities in dealing with climate change to take decisive actions. A country that assumes more responsibilities and take more active actions will encounter more costs and sacrifice. As a political compensation, the international society should establish encouraging political principles; those countries that assume the greatest responsibilities in emissions reduction should take the most benefits in the global climate governance institution. The international society should promote the realization of the goals of dealing with global climate change step by step by establishing a differentiated power distribution system in order to fit with the global emissions reduction responsibility system and by establishing a global

climate governance institution so as to consolidate the two systems.

2. Respecting the carbon emission sovereignty of relevant parties and establishing the principle of coordination and consensus.

Global climate change is an urgent issue facing the whole world, and the sense of urgency of relevant parties dealing with climate change is also increasingly rising. However, the global governance action for dealing with climate change cannot seek an unrealistic “one big final step”; it can only establish a decision making institution of coordination and consensus by proceeding from reality and respecting the diversity of international society and on the basis of respecting the carbon emission sovereignty of all relevant parties.

Respecting the carbon emission sovereignty is the foremost decision making principle in the UN climate change process. Climate change is a global issue, but the global action for dealing with climate change is country-based. Under the condition of no world government and global public authority in today's world, any political agreement for climate change must be based on respecting the sovereignty of relevant countries and seek a balance between respecting national sovereignty and the global action of promoting dealing with climate change. On the one hand, no country can avoid its responsibility by any pretext; public-opinion criticisms and moral scolding should be directed at countries that avoid responsibilities and damage climate change conferences. Every country needs to assume corresponding responsibilities for the accumulation of greenhouse gas emission since industrialization and make reasonable arrangements in establishing emission reduction targets, emission peak, reduction plan, and capital and technological support. On the other hand, no country can bear responsibilities that are beyond its capability and can only establish action plans from its own power realities. Even if they accept goals that are beyond their capabilities, the result will be either an empty promise that cannot be realized or the triggering of more serious humanitarian crises.

Coordination and consensus is the key rule in UN climate change negotiations. Starting from respecting the carbon emission sovereignty of all parties, the UN climate change negotiation process needs to establish a decision making institution acceptable to all parties by upholding the principle of coordination and consensus, especially in encouraging the voluntary emission reduction actions of relevant parties and gathering their consensus. In climate negotiations, no country can pursue power politics and intervene in the domestic politics of other countries in the name of dealing with climate change and impinge on reasonable emission rights of other peoples by transforming the constraint on states and governments into the constraints on national citizens. At the same time, in the negotiation on emission reduction targets, there is the need to combine long-term goals and short-term plans, comprehensively balance the relationship between reduction intensity

and difficulty, encourage “fast small steps” rather than “one big final step” from the starting point of the bearable capabilities of each country in the short term, and leave room in devising emission reduction targets by considering additional factors such as accidents like financial crisis and natural disasters. Therefore, in reaching an agreement, the international society needs to combine doing the best with doing according to capabilities, patiently and fully conduct coordination regarding practical difficulties of emission reductions of different countries, and persistently strengthen mutual trust and expand consensus. In this process, it should resolutely oppose irresponsible behavior that damages international trust such as unilaterally raising “carbon tax” and “border adjustment fee” in order to create a favorable negotiating environment for climate governance.

In addition, the UN climate change conference also needs to pay attention to “pressure reduction” in terms of countries' emission reduction responsibilities and hand over responsibilities that cannot be borne by these countries to multinational corporations and NGOs. The Copenhagen conference attracted thousands of NGOs and media, fully demonstrating the activeness of these organizations. The UN climate change conference may consider this as a starting point, give a special consultative position to NGOs, fully mobilize the activeness of NGOs, global media and scientific communities, support all kinds of public-opinion monitoring and social movements, and create powerful public-opinion pressures and the “soft balancing” of moral constraints on greenhouse gas emission. Handing over problems that cannot be agreed on by state actions to non-state actors may be more effective than forcing countries to reach agreements.

3. Establishing a fair and reasonable verification principle and devising a universally accepted carbon emission standard.

Humans need carbon emission. The key of the global climate change problem lies in establishing reasonable carbon emission production style and lifestyle. The key to solving the problem of carbon emissions is to establish the principle of responsibilities-rights consistency, and emissions reduction standards should be related to population scale, development speed, technological level, and capital capacity. The human-centrism which pursues wanton emissions regardless of everything else and the approach of “one size fits all” and coercive reduction that pursues unrealistic emission reduction targets and neglects different national circumstances are both extremely wrong and will inevitably face a dead end. The key of governing global climate change and curtailing greenhouse gas emission lies in establishing a universally accepted carbon emission standard and establishing a fair and just monitoring and verification system.

Past approaches, from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to the Kyoto Protocol, from the Bali Road Map to the Copenhagen Accord, overemphasized greenhouse gas emission reduction targets, reduction responsibilities and reduction steps, overlooked the key problem

of carbon emission standards that is at the center of governing global climate change, underestimated the prohibiting factor of the world's diversities and differences in creating a governing institution for climate change, and eventually produced only a slow international reduction process. Overcoming the current difficulty and deadlock requires shifting the emphasis to quickly devising a universally accepted carbon emission standard. The Cancun conference in Mexico should prioritize establishing a carbon emission standard and make a principled statement on the responsibilities that countries need to assume and the rights that they can share according to this carbon emission standard.

Establishing a carbon emission standard is a complicated system that requires making overall plans and taking all factors into consideration. First, a carbon emission standard needs to first consider a personal average emission standard and not to create a discriminatory emission standard against some countries' personal average emissions. Second, on the basis of establishing a personal average emission standard, we need to establish a unit GDP carbon emission national standard in accordance with the country's GDP growth. Requiring countries with fast GDP growth to have the same carbon emission standard with countries with slow GDP growth is almost impossible, just like requiring athletes with great exercise intensity to have the same breathing rates with ordinary people. Therefore, we should establish carbon emission intensity as the criterion for the national emission standard, and rigorously restrict a country's unit GDP emission, but do not restrict the reasonable requests for modernizing development from emerging economies. Third, we also need to comprehensively devise a national emission peak standard, according to the needs of global climate change trends and in conjunction with each country's historical emission responsibilities, realize the reduction and control of the world's total carbon emission volume in a prescribed period, and gradually incorporate restricting carbon emission into an institutionalized channel.

At the same time, establishing a carbon emission standard also needs to be combined with a rigorous verification and monitoring system in order to ensure fulfillment of global emission reduction responsibilities. Countries reduce carbon emission intensity by relying on the statistical, monitoring and verification system established by the international society. Currently, there have already emerged some relatively normative methodologies and standards for calculating greenhouse gas, including A Guide to IPCC Inventory, Greenhouse Gas Emission Agreement: Rules in Corporate Accounting and Reporting released by the World Resource Institute (WRI) and the World Business Council of Sustainable Development (WBCSD), and ISO14064 released by the International Standards Organization. However, these methodologies and standards only provide basic rules and principles in calculation. Applying them domestically requires targeted analysis of specific situations; the determination of basic data especially requires pertinent analysis and research. The international society should continue to promote research on the measurement, reporting and verification of greenhouse gas, gradually establish a set of systematic and scientific methods for

calculating and reporting greenhouse gas emission, and gradually incorporate greenhouse gas emissions reduction into an institutionalized channel.

4. Exploring climate governance principles and establishing climate governance institutions.

It is impossible to reach an agreement limiting greenhouse gas emissions on a global level without the acceptance of a principle initiative with binding force on national actions. However, this principle initiative is only a general position and attitude toward limiting greenhouse gas emissions and is often hard to operationalize in situations that lack specific applicability. Therefore, while advancing a principle initiative, the UN climate change conference also needs to strengthen institutional innovation in climate governance and persistently explore institutional innovation in fields of organizational leadership, capital assistance, technological cooperation, international assistance and monitoring and verification, in order to provide a driving force for governing climate change and international emissions reduction through institutional innovation.

First is to promote establishing a UN Climate Governing Council. The global emissions reduction process was dominated by big greenhouse gas emitters. On the basis of fully playing the role of the UN, we need to promote establishing a UN Climate Governing Council that is similar to the UN Security Council based on great power cooperation. Countries can join in terms of their voluntarily assumed emissions reduction responsibilities, and the order of the Council seats and positions can be determined by the share of assumed responsibilities in order to reflect the principle of rights-responsibilities consistency. On this basis, an NGO special council can be established to give a special consultative role to NGOs, thus encouraging international NGOs to express their own opinions. This UN Climate Governing Council is to create a global governance institution with action capabilities, responsible for the improvement of the principle initiative of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the planning of actions, and to undertake keeping operations like the UN Security Council peace keeping missions toward countries that violate the convention, in order to overcome the collective action dilemma resulting from inadequate organizational leadership.

Second is to promote establishing a global climate change public fund. Because all countries emit greenhouse gas to different degrees, all member states should take a certain proportion from their carbon taxes according to personal average consumption to create their carbon fund amounts. They can then establish a global climate change public fund by voluntary donation and establish the quotas of special drawing rights. Fund distribution of the UN climate change public fund will be determined by collective voting of all donating countries according to certain voting rights. Developed countries' resource assistance to developing countries will also be incorporated into this fund, and no longer through the office of UN Official Development Assistance.

Third is to promote establishing a climate technology committee. Because different countries have different levels of climate technology development and because climate technology belongs to the public, it is hard for governments to make hard-and-fast rules on technology transfer. Therefore, the UN can establish a climate technology cooperation council, incorporating companies from different countries as its members on the condition of technological cooperation and establishing a UN climate technology cooperation development program. The UN climate change governance process should establish the principle of "trade emissions reduction for technology". Countries can determine their emissions reduction volumes according to their own circumstances, and the UN climate technology committee can provide corresponding technological assistance according to countries' emissions reduction volumes, thus promoting the international energy saving and emission reduction process by combining corporate market expansion, UN technological assistance, and countries' emissions reduction responsibilities.

Fourth is to promote establishing an international institution on disaster prevention and alleviation cooperation. Climate change does not only emphasize emissions reduction and restriction but also climate relief. Every year the world witnesses a great number of climate disasters such as floods, droughts, and hurricanes. The UN climate change governance should also take the establishment of a climate disaster prevention and alleviation cooperation institution as an important task. In concert with establishing a UN Climate Council, it needs to create a UN disaster prevention and alleviation special operation team similar to the UN peace keeping force, with disaster relief personnel dispatched from member states. Whenever there are climate disaster assistance requests in the international society, the UN disaster prevention and alleviation special operation team can react rapidly and integrate the strengths of different countries in disaster prevention and alleviation.

Fifth is to promote establishing an international emissions reduction verification organization. Under the UN Climate Council, a relatively independent international emissions reduction verification organization also needs to be created, composed of a professional international emissions reduction verification team from member states, international organizations and NGOs. It carries out all-weather emissions reduction verification and detection and publicly issues detection reports to provide justification for the UN Climate Council decision making.

5. Promoting flexible climate diplomacy and establishing a wide climate consensus.

Dealing with climate change is a long-term project. Dealing with climate change and promoting a low-carbon economy involves complicated interests. In addition there are great differences in international society. The eruption of problems takes time, so are contradictions that need to be solved. China faces heavy pressures over greenhouse gas emissions as the fastest develop-

ing economy. China's carbon emission volume reached 6.017 billion tons after 2006, surpassing America's 5.902 billion tons to become the world's No. 1. The world's total carbon emission volume has increased 7.5 billion tons since 1990, and China's has increased 3.7 billion tons accounting for half of the world's total. The cumulative increase of developing countries is 5.4 billion tons, and our increase accounts for two thirds of the total increase of developing countries in 16 years. Even if China's economic development speed slows to an annual growth rate of 2.8 percent, it may still emit 11.7 billion tons in 2030. This figure will inevitably catch the attention of developed and developing countries. Second, the United States, the EU and other small island developing states will focus all of their attentions on China and restrict China by moral scolding, political pressure and all kinds of protectionist measures, making China even more reactive in diplomacy.

The existence of contradictions and disagreements is not frightful; the key is to solve them through diplomatic channels of dialogue and negotiation. Therefore, China needs to vigorously promote flexible climate diplomacy, actively participate in international cooperation, and deal with the global problem of climate change together with international society. For example, it can participate in international climate change negotiations under the UN framework, explicate China's positions in various international forums, conduct dialogue and cooperation with some countries in the climate field and gradually reach a climate consensus. In addition, taking the opportunity of dealing with climate change, China needs to widely enhance the public consciousness, mobilize the active participation of the strengths and resources of the whole society, speed up the adjustment and improvement of the national economic structure, recognize and cultivate new resources, and create new drivers for social economic development, so as to transform an external pressure into an internal driver, transform challenges into opportunities, pioneer and innovate, strengthen capability building, construct an ecological civilization, and enhance the country's level of sustainable development.

The earth is the common homestead of humanity, and climate change and environmental protection is the common issue for all mankind. As a global public problem, the key of dealing with climate change is to reasonably control the scale of carbon emissions, but carbon emission is directed related to economic scale, growth rate, development phase, technological level, capital capacity and other factors. The focus of the problem is not whether we need to impose a binding and rigid restriction on the total volume of global carbon emission, but how to realize the rights-responsibilities consistency among countries and achieve a fair justice in the climate problem. Therefore, developed and developing countries alike should sincerely stick to the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" and devise multiple but reasonable carbon emissions reduction standards in order to build a world of fair carbon emissions.