# 构建一个和平的中东

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清华国际安全论坛研究报告 No.5

清华大学当代国际关系研究院

2011年7月9日

内容提要 ...

◆ 目前，西亚北非国家发生的普遍性政权危机，与上世纪80年代末东欧国家的政权危机有很多相似之处。事情发生的突然性、连锁性很强，发生时间集中，发生危机国家的政治体制相似，外国势力迅速介入，引发军事冲突。与当年东欧国家政权危机不同的是，现在处于政权危机中的阿拉伯国家却是面临着不同的进程和结果。

◆ 阿拉伯国家政权危机的长期因素是其政权合法性的基础发生了从君权向民权的转变，而近期因素是美国在中东地区主导地位的下降。冷战后，阿拉伯国家与美国及以色列关系的改善，使阿拉伯国家政权的合法性越来越依赖于美国的支持。由美国支持而带来的自由民主思想逐渐削弱了穆斯林主义作为政权合法性的基础。2008年的金融危机和奥巴马政府决定2010年从伊拉克撤军，削弱了美国对阿拉伯盟友的支持力度。美国主导力的下降使得防止多米诺式政权危机的支柱断裂。

◆ 本报告认为，中东地区的动荡局势将长期持续，地区军事冲突有扩大和增加的危险，中东大国争夺本地化，西方大国对中东的影响力将进一步下降。国际社会的当务之急是应对战争和军事冲突问题而不是发展问题，即如何停止现有的战争和军事冲突，避免新的战争和军事冲突的发生，防止恐怖暴力活动向外扩散。

◆ 国际社会应支持西亚北非国家依据本国实际情况进行政治改革，减少因政治危机而产生的社会暴力冲突。由联合国派出维和部队，促使利比亚战争双方停火。限制对西亚北非地区冲突各方军事行动的物质支持，防止战争规模升级。消除反恐双重标准，降低中东恐怖主义势力扩散的危险。

构建一个和平的中东

2011年初，一名突尼斯失业大学生自焚引发了突尼斯政府倒台。随后阿拉伯国家出现了多米诺骨牌式的政权危机，利比亚和也门甚至爆发了战争或军事冲突。联合国、阿拉伯联盟、非洲联盟、海湾合作委员会、北约、国际刑事法庭等多个国际组织都介入到这场地区危机之中。美国、法国、英国、意大利等西方国家更是积极参与利比亚战争。中东这场政治动荡不但没有结束的迹象，反而愈演愈烈，甚至可能引发更多的战争。对于当前的中东来讲，合作、和谐与发展都还是政治奢望，最为现实的目标是如何停止战争、军事冲突，实现和平。为了避免新的军事冲突爆发，为了结束正在进行的战争，我们需要了解目前中东危机的原因，判断其变化趋势，探讨实现地区和平的有效策略。

一、阿拉伯国家政权危机及有关解释

（一）危机的特点和类型

目前，西亚北非国家发生的普遍性政权危机，与上世纪80年代末东欧国家的政权危机有很多相似之处。事情发生的突然性、连锁性很强，发生时间集中，发生危机国家的政治体制相似，外国势力迅速介入，引发军事冲突。与当年东欧国家政权危机结果相似不同的是，现在处于政权危机中

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的阿拉伯国家仍然面临着不同的进程和结果。依据目前正在形成的局势，这些政权危机国家大体可分为三种类型：

第一类是政权已更迭的国家，即突尼斯和埃及两国。在突尼斯，已执政23年的本•阿里于2011年1月14日被迫下台；在埃及，已连续统治32年的穆巴拉克在强撑18天后，也于2011年2月11日被迫下台。新政权建立后，这些国家的政治动荡远未结束，民众对于新政权的政策并未表现出积极的支持，不满于对旧政权统治集团的处理措施，要求更严厉地惩罚他们。民众还对新政权不能迅速改变高失业和高通涨感到强烈不满。由于新政府缺少权威，无力有效恢复社会秩序，与此

同时，民众中蕴藏着巨大的激情，继续企图以街头抗议改变政权，因此突尼斯和埃及仍不断出现抗议示威事件。

第二类是政权尚未更迭，但危机不断加深的国家，如利比亚、也门和叙利亚。利比亚已经陷入战争。联合国于3月19日通过在利比亚建立禁飞区的决议，在西方国家空军的支持下，反卡扎菲武装与利比亚政府军爆发了全面战争。由于北约只提供空中军事支持而不派出地面部队，利比亚战争双方陷入了拉锯战。也门于1月发生民众抗议活动，总统萨利赫拒绝交出政权，政府与反政府力量曾经发生武装冲突。总统萨利赫于6月3日被炸伤，前往沙特医治，国家政权暂由副总统负责。反对派声称政府已经倒台，但政府表示总统治愈后很快就回国。"基地"组织阿拉伯半岛分支占领了也门南部阿比扬省省会津吉巴尔，并宣称为他们所建立的伊斯兰酋长国的首都。叙利亚于3月18日爆发大规模反政府示威，巴沙尔政府动用武力镇压，迄今已造成数百人丧生。叙利亚是中东反对以色列的先锋和伊朗在西亚北非地区最重要的盟友，美欧均出台了制裁叙利亚的措施，支持反政府力量，要求巴沙尔下台。

第三类是反政府势力在发展，但政府仍能控制秩序的国家。在巴林，人口中占多数的什叶派穆斯林提出了推翻逊尼派王室统治的要求。阿尔及利亚的反政府游行要求总统布特弗利卡辞职。约旦反对派呼吁首相萨米尔·里法伊下台。摩洛哥反对派要求国王穆罕默德下放权力，铲除政府贪污。此外，沙特阿拉伯、阿曼、苏丹、吉布提、索马里、科威特、黎巴嫩也出现了一些反政府抗议活动。然而，这些国家的反政府势力相对较弱，不足以迫使政府下台。以沙特为首的海湾合作委员会成员国政府相互支持，联手压制各国的反政府运动。3月14日，在海湾合作委员会的支持下，巴林国王哈马德宣布全国进入三个月紧急状态，沙特的1000名士兵和阿联酋的500名警察进驻该国帮助平乱。海湾合作委员会的军事行动得到了美国和其他西方国家的支持。西方国家领导人在有关当前中局势的讲话中都不提海湾合作委员会成员国的名字。

（二）既有的危机原因解释

媒体上关于当前阿拉伯国家政权危机的主要解释有"专制独裁说"、"经济落后说"、"两极分化说"和"网络煽动说"四种。这些说法虽然有一定的道理，但是解释不了为什么政权危机发生的时间如此集中，更解释不了为什么君主制国家比共和制国家面临的政权危机小，能保住政权。

媒体上关于当前阿拉伯国家政权危机的主要解释有"专制独裁说"、"经济落后说"、"两极分化说"和"网络煽动说"四种。这些说法虽然有一定的道理，但是解释不了为什么政权危机发生的时间如此集中，更解释不了为什么君主制国家比共和制国家面临的政权危机小，能保住政权。

"专制独裁说"认为，西亚北非的政权危机源于这些国家没有采取西方式的民主政治制度。持这种看法的多是信奉自由主义理论的人士。该地区国家确实普遍存在着终身执政、君主专制和家族世袭等现象，但这种解释却无法解释下列事实：第一，西亚北非国家自建国后就普遍实行现

有的政治制度，这种制度在过去几十年都是相对稳定的。甚至在20世纪90年代民主化大潮冲跨了东欧国家的政权时，这些西亚北非的领导人都可以保住政权。直到2010年，该地区才出现普遍的政权根基动摇以及领导人被迫下台现象。第二，这次首先出现政权更替的突尼斯是这些政权危机国家中政治相对清明的，其民主程度排世界第32位，廉洁程度甚至超过意大利。第三，在此次阿拉伯国家政权危机中，共和制国家的政权危机比君主制国家严重。被认为最专制的海湾君主国政权都控制住了局势，保住了政权，没有发生突尼斯等共和制国家那样政权倒台的现象。因此，依据西方的民主理论，将此次西亚北非国家的普遍政权危机说成是政治独裁所致是缺乏说服力的。

"经济落后说"认为，西亚北非国家发生政权危机的原因是这些国家未能把经济建设搞好，民众的生活缺乏社会保障。持这种看法的多是从事经济工作或经济研究的人士。这种经济决定论的说法基本不符合实情。此次多数发生政权危机的国家是石油输出国，人均GDP远高于新兴经济体国家。利比亚和巴林都是高收入国家，本国公民几乎没有从事体力劳动的，整体社会福利水平比新兴经济体国家高得多。突尼斯经济竞争力位居非洲第一，世界第40，幸福指数位居世界第29位，曾被列为"抵御金融危机十佳国家"之一。埃及2008年被列为"全球最佳改革国家"之一，在178个国家中列第26位，在中东仅次于阿联酋和以色列。埃及2006-2008年的经济增长率达7%，即使在深受金融危机影响的2009年和2010年，经济增长率仍达到3%和5.8%。将中东国家政权危机归结为经济发展落后的说法，不仅解释力弱，而且与客观事实有较大的不一致。

"两极分化说"认为，西亚北非国家政权危机的原因是这些国家的政府严重腐败和社会两极分化导致民众对政府不满。这种解释在信奉社会主义政策的人士中比较流行。在西亚北非地区，5%的人支配了80%的财富。这是该地区的客观现象，但严重的腐败和两极分化现象并非是近年才发生的，而是长期存在的历史现象。民众对于腐败和两极分化的不满也不是一个逐渐积累的过程。自殖民主义统治结束后，该地区的民众一直不满政府的腐败和社会的两极分化。下层民众一直认为他们没有从民族独立的成果中得到应有的好处。然而，在过去几十年里，对政府腐败和社会两极分化的不满从未带来反对终身执政的政治诉求，政权更迭多数是通过政变实现的，而不是通过大规模群众革命实现的。由此可见，政府腐败和社会两极分化的解释也缺乏有效的说服力。

"网络煽动说"认为，目前西亚北非国家政权危机的主要原因是手机、脸谱和微博等现代通讯技术导致的。"维基解密"披露外国称突尼斯本•阿里政府为"黑手党"，网络传播失业大学生自焚事件，脸谱、微博在推翻穆巴拉克过程中使反政府力量很方便地传播消息、组织动员和内外联络。这种解释在年轻人和IT业者中非常流行。然而，这种解释有很大的缺陷，不能解释为什么这些通讯手段在两年前或在其他地区起不到这种引发政权危机的作用。手机和网络只是承载和传播信息的工具，这种现代通讯工具遍布世界各地，也包括其他地区的独裁国家。然而，这次政权危机却集中在西亚北非地区，这显然无法用"网络煽动说"来解释。

与上述几种解释相比，更多人认为是上述几种因素综合的结果。这种综合分析法在辩证主义者中很流行。他们承认，所有上述因素单独存在都不足以解释为什么这些阿拉伯国家在2011年集

中发生了政权危机，但将上述因素都加到一起就足以解释此次危机。持这种看法的人认为，之所以上述因素的综合作用在2011年前没有发生作用，原因在于上述因素积累起来的综合力量还不够大。根据从量变到质变的辩证法原理，他们认为是到了2011年才积累了足够大的力量。这种解释听起来比前几种解释的说服力强，但有一个严重缺陷，即没有确定质变的标准，其解释形同同义反复。由于不知道在什么程度条件下会发生质变，于是看到事情发生了就说是发生了质变，没看到就说是还没达到质变的程度。这种辩证综合分析仍不能告诉我们，为什么阿拉伯国家会在2011年初集中发生政权危机。

二、美国支持的弱化

既然上述解释都缺乏足够的说服力来解释目前发生的阿拉伯国家政权危机，因此我们需要从危机发生的长期因素和近期催化因素相结合的角度进行分析。本报告认为，阿拉伯国家政权危机的长期因素是其政权合法性的基础发生了从君权向民权的转变，而近期因素是美国在中东地区主导地位的

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下降。冷战后，阿拉伯国家与美国及以色列关系的改善，使阿拉伯国家政权的合法性越来越依赖于美国的支持。由美国支持而带来的自由民主思想逐渐削弱了穆斯林主义作为政权合法性的基础。2008年的金融危机和奥巴马政府决定2010年从伊拉克撤军，削弱了美国对阿拉伯盟友的支持力度。美国主导力的下降使得防止多米诺式政权危机的支柱断裂。

（一）阿拉伯政权合法性遭遇挑战

阿拉伯国家青年人的公民意识逐渐增长，主权在民的概念变得流行起来。主权在民的公民意识促使阿拉伯国家政权的合法性基础向社会发展进步转移。这种转移弱化了传统的君权至上和以国家主权为中心的民族主义在政权合法性中的作用。

> 主权在民的公民意识促使阿拉伯国家政权的合法性基础向社会发展进步转移。这种转移弱化了传统的君权至上和以国家主权为中心的民族主义在政权合法性中的作用。

首先，冷战后外部安全威胁的下降弱化了阿拉伯国家的政权合法性。冷战时期，阿拉伯国家面临的主要主权威胁来自西方和以色列，为此

阿拉伯国家与以色列在1948-1982年的30多年里先后进行了5次战争。维护国家安全和主权成为阿拉伯国家政权合法性的重要基础之一。外部安全威胁抑制了阿拉伯国家内部的社会矛盾，民众基本上是支持本国政府的。1979年埃及与以色列单独媾和曾受到阿拉伯世界的广泛批评，但冷战结束后，越来越多的阿拉伯国家开始效仿埃及，放弃反美反以政策。到2004年连一贯反美的卡扎菲都放弃核计划，与美国改善了关系。阿拉伯国家与美国和以色列关系的改善，使得很多阿拉伯国家的政权合法性基础从维护国家主权向社会发展转移。

其次，社会意识形态的变化也弱化了阿拉伯国家原有的政权合法性。阿拉伯国家的政体主要分为君主制和共和制两种。君主制国家其意识形态的合法性来自于伊斯兰主义＋王族的历史，而共和制国家意识形态的合法性建立在伊斯兰主义＋民族主义之上。冷战后，全球民主化思潮对阿拉伯国家年轻人的意识形态产生了很大影响，加之20世纪80年代起阿拉伯国家新生人口数量不断增加，因此西方民主思想开始与传统的穆斯林主义分庭抗礼。阿拉伯共和制国家宣称实行民主和选举制，因此西方民主意识在这些国家发展得较快。而君主制国家从不承诺放弃王权，因此在这些国家西方民主意识发展得较慢。这是共和制国家的反政府力量比君主制国家要强大的重要原因之一。

在国家安全和意识形态两个政权合法性基础均遭弱化的情况下，阿拉伯国家需要以社会发展的业绩来弥补。然而，多数阿拉伯国家，无论其经济水平高低，都存在严重的两极分化和官员腐败现象。据估计，每年有数百亿美元流入统治集团的私人腰包。据"维基解密"文件称，在突尼斯，只要是本·阿里家族看上的，无论是现金、土地、房屋甚至游艇，最终都会落入他们手中，该家族总资产达35亿英镑；另据报道，利比亚总统卡扎菲的八子一女分别涉足石油、燃气、酒店、媒体、流通、通信、基础设施等产业，基本控制了国家的经济命脉。而埃及前总统穆巴拉克家族的资产据称达到了400-700亿美元。

自20世纪80年代以来，阿拉伯国家人口出生率是世界上最高的，60%人口的年龄在25岁以下。年轻人易于接受新思想和新事物。冷战后的民主化大潮使他们形成了倾向于自由民主的西方价值观。即使在物质条件较为优越的时期，他们亦有强烈的社会变革要求，而在失业的情况下，这种要求就会变得更加强烈。在埃及，占总人口70%的年轻人面临失业的危险，甚至受过高等教育的人也很难找到工作。阿尔及利亚3/4的人口年龄在30岁以下，全国失业率高达25%。约旦的失业率高达14%。国际劳工组织2011年公布数据称，年轻人失业率最高的地区是中东和北非，两地的失业率均在24%上下，年轻人的失业率可能是成年失业率的3倍。

在共和制国家，政府虽然宣称实行民主和选举，但实际上搞的是终身制，甚至有建立家族政权的意图，是变相的君主制。埃及总统穆巴拉克、也门总统萨利赫执政均超过30年，利比亚总统卡扎菲已执政41年，而且他们还有意让其子接班。这就更使民众产生强烈的反政府情绪。

亲美政策也弱化了阿拉伯国家政权的合法性。近些年，多数阿拉伯国家将加强与西方关系、尤其是对美关系作为重中之重，但这种政策在穆斯林民众当中引起了强烈的反感。1990年以来，西方在世界上共发动了5场大规模战争（海湾战争、科索沃战争、阿富汗战争、伊拉克战争和

2011年的利比亚战争），其中4场在伊斯兰世界，3次直接针对阿拉伯国家。特别是9·11事件之后，美国的反恐战争变相地将穆斯林等同于恐怖主义者，这极大加剧了穆斯林民众对美国的反感，因此他们对于本国政府的亲美政策非常不满。

亲美外交政策使阿拉伯国家难以有效应对以色列的安全威胁，进而引起了民众的严重不满。2006年，以色列因真主党绑架了几名以色列士兵而入侵黎巴嫩；2008年底，以色列又以哈马斯发射火箭弹为由，对加沙地带发动代号为"铸铅行动"的大规模军事打击行动。亲西方的阿拉伯国家政府对这些事件态度软弱，有些政府的立场甚至还不如土耳其这个北约成员国。阿拉伯国家的民众痛感国家丧失尊严和民族自豪感，对政府的不满不断增加。

政权合法性的严重不足，使得统治集团和既得利益集团以外的所有人都变成反对派。穷人厌恶富人豪华奢侈，平民反对权贵巧取豪夺，教士反感世俗化带来声色犬马，民主派则激烈批驳专制统治。

（二）美国中东主导地位的弱化

2008年金融危机的冲击和美国决定从伊拉克和阿富汗撤军弱化了美国在中东的主导地位。在阿拉伯国家政权危机发生之际，美国不仅没有向其传统盟友迅速提供经济和军事支持，而且在政治上摇摆不定，并最终转向支持反政府力量。美国无力为西亚北非盟友提供及时支持，至使该地区发生了多米诺骨牌式的政权危机，而非局限于个别国家。

2008年的金融危机是美国自第二次世界大战以来所经历的最为严重的一次经济危机，对美国综合国力的影响较为明显。今年美国的国债已经达到国会限定的上限，致使国会拒绝批准奥巴马政府提出的财政预算案。美国联邦政府为此作好了关闭部分政府机构的准备。这次危机还造成美国失业率居高不下，奥巴马政府面临巨大的国内政治和财政压力。

这场经济危机还削弱了美国在中东的国际影响力。首先，经济困难使美国难以对面临政权危机的阿拉伯盟友提供必要的经济支持。今年5月奥巴马发表中东政策讲话时，仍强调对中东民主改革的支持方式不是经济援助而是贸易与投资。其次，经济困难坚定了奥巴马政府从阿富汗和伊拉克撤军的决心。然而，在伊拉克和阿富汗战争未能实现政治目标的情况下就决定按时撤军，其政治含义就是美国将无力为其阿拉伯盟友提供可靠的军事支持。在今年年初突尼斯与埃及发生政权危机时，美国未能迅速向该地区派出军舰，反而是伊朗首先派出了两艘军舰。奥巴马坚决不同意向利比亚派地面部队，也说明美国确实无力再向中东盟友提供可靠的军事支持。

2008年的金融危机和奥巴马从伊拉克和阿富汗撤军的决策，表明美国正在中东地区实行战

略收缩政策。这种战略收缩不可避免地要引发该地区政治生态的变化。20世纪80年代末，在全球民主化大潮下，苏联的战略收缩引发了东欧国家的政权更替。当时的中东政权也面临巨大外部冲击，但由于中东处于美国的势力范围之内，而美国又是冷战的最大胜利者，因此有能力为中东盟友提供足够的庇护和援助，使之逃过了政权更替的威胁。然而，9·11事件后，阿富汗战争和伊拉克战争成为消耗美国国力的黑洞。据美国经济学家斯蒂格利茨等人的计算，仅伊拉克战争就消耗了美国3万亿美元。奥巴马上台后，在中东推行"新尼克松主义"，战略收缩态势明显，对中东的战略投入和地区影响力均在下降，致使中东亲美和反美势力此消彼长，潜在矛盾日趋凸显。

面对该地区亲美势力不断受到冲击的局面，美国显得无可奈何，既无意亦无力及时"补位"，更多的是被动应付。美国国务卿希拉里就曾发出感叹："当我们努力对（埃及）局势发展提供一些帮助和建议时，却发现我们只是一个站在门外看热闹的局外人。"当前，美国对中东北非政局动荡的心态非常矛盾：一方面希望中东加快民主改革，借此转移和化解统治压力，稳固亲美政权根基，另一方面又担心中东变革走向极端，导致反美反西方势力上台，因此不断在"变革与维稳"之间徘徊。为尽可能减少损失，美国避免与失败者站在一起，采取"因国而异"的多重标准政策：一是力保沙特等海湾产油国，默许沙特、阿联酋联手出兵巴林，镇压当地抗议民众；二是鼓励埃及、突尼斯等北非国家的民众抗议和政治转型，但力求使其变革进程保持在美国可接受的范围内。2011年初，奥巴马在国情咨文中就明确表态支持突尼斯人的自由、民主诉求，暗压其他阿拉伯国家实行改革。埃及骚乱后，美国曾鼓动埃及军队废黜穆巴拉克，使其像当年埃及的青年军官废黜法鲁克国王一样。三是对利比亚、叙利亚等反美国家煽风点火，公开鼓励抗议者，参与空袭利比亚，制裁叙利亚。美国这种"多重标准"做法，实际上进一步削弱了阿拉伯民众和执政者对美国的信任。

三、更加动荡的中东

根据以上分析，本报告预测，中东地区的动荡局势将长期持续，地区军事冲突有扩大和增加的危险，中东大国争夺本地化，西方大国对中东的影响力将进一步下降。

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（一）阿拉伯国家政权危机问题长期持续

阿拉伯国家政权危机不会使有关国家都成功地民主化，而很有可能出现三种不同结果。一些国家通过危机实现非西方式的民主化。伊斯兰文化在阿拉伯国家的主导地位决定了这些阿拉伯国家的民主化不可能是完全西式的。它们很可能效仿土耳其，建立西方式的世俗政府，并以军队为政权的基础，而社会意识形态仍以伊斯兰主义为主体。采取共和制并发生政权更迭的国家有可能

向这一结果演变。第二类国家将在保持君主制稳定的前提下进行一些社会改革。海湾合作组织的国家有可能如此。第三类国家则可能处于长期战乱或内乱之中。这些国家或是长期处于内战，或是分裂成两个国家，或是不断发生军事政变。实行共和制但军队派系矛盾严重的国家有可能面临这种结果。

然而，这三种结果都将进一步提高军队在国家政治生活中的作用。在阿拉伯世界，军队是组织化程度最高、阶级属性非常模糊的集团，因此很适合担当政治争端的仲裁者，乃至幕后的操纵者。埃及自1952年建立共和国后的三任领导人(纳赛尔、萨达特、穆巴拉克)均是军人出身。如今埃及的政治转型还是在军队的主持下进行。今后2-3年内，无论是发生政权更替的国家还是维持原有政权不变的国家都不得不进行社会改革，而社会改革过程必然有很多地方使民众不满，因此多数阿拉伯国家都将面临维持政权稳定的严峻考验。为了维持社会稳定，阿拉伯国家将不得不动用军队来维护秩序，调解利益纷争。有些国家的军队实行幕后操纵，有的国家军队则很可能走上前台。

伊斯兰组织将更加活跃。多数阿拉伯国家没有现代意义上的政治反对派，而各种伊斯兰组织十分活跃。伊斯兰势力意识形态明晰，组织化程度高，且建立起较完备的社会救助和福利体系，在中下层人气颇高。这次中东北非危机使当权者对伊斯兰组织的管控能力下降，使其活动空间变大。突尼斯伊斯兰政党已合法化，埃及释放了关押多年的圣战组织领导人及其追随者。埃及穆斯林兄弟会成立了"自由与正义党"，以谋求未来全国选举，并呼吁阿拉伯国家效仿伊朗政治模式。中东北非危机有从北非向其南边邻国扩展的可能。北非国家的南边邻国多数是伊斯兰国家，它们与北非国家在政治和宗教上的相似性使其很可能受到影响。

（二）地区军事冲突存在上升的趋势

冷战后，西亚北非地区成为世界上战争和军事冲突最多的地区，超过了撒哈拉以南非洲和拉丁美洲。美国和北约接受了伊拉克战争和阿富汗战争的教训，对利比亚采取只进行空中打击而不派地面部队的策略。这种策略只会延长战争的时间而不会提高结束战争的能力。如果美国从阿富汗逐步撤军，将意味着阿富汗战争的进一步长期化。同时，美国的撤军还将减轻基地组织的军事压力，基地组织在西亚北非的暴力活动能力将因此得以增强。在北约不派地面部队的条件下，利比亚战争可能长期持续。北约已经意识到这一点，因此宣布从6月1日起再轰炸90天。无论卡扎菲是否放弃政权，利比来的内战都可能长期化。卡扎菲下台，利比亚部族间的争斗将使军事冲突不断；卡扎菲与反对派政权达成分治协议，双方的军事冲突也不会彻底结束。在总统萨利赫被炸伤后，也门的军事冲突没有弱化趋势，反而更加激烈。

除了现有的战争之外，该地区有爆发新军事冲突的危险。以色列和伊朗是引发新军事冲突的两个主要国家。以色列历来追求绝对安全，地区战略关系的变化有可能引发新的巴以军事冲突。6月5日，叙利亚抗议者冲击停火线，要进入戈兰高地，以色列军队开枪打死至少13名抗议者并打伤100多人。埃及新政府改变了对以政策，使哈马斯与埃及从敌手变为合作伙伴，巴勒斯坦的反

以势力得到增强。以色列和巴勒斯坦双方的针锋相对政策使双方军事冲突可能性增大。以色列与黎巴嫩真主党发生军事冲突的可能性也在上升。此前，以色列曾两次入侵黎巴嫩，重点打击真主党。而目前真主党已在黎巴嫩上台掌权，军事实力也基本恢复。面对伊朗地区影响力的扩大，以色列要突破伊朗所支持的激进势力的围困态势，有可能再次军事打击真主党。

伊朗核问题有可能引发以色列与伊朗之间的军事冲突。中东政治动荡进一步加强了伊朗发展核武器的决心。利比亚放弃核计划后受到了北约的军事打击，这使伊朗坚信发展核武器是维护政权安全的根本保障。阿拉伯国家政权危机，为伊朗扩大地区影响和成为地区强国提供了机会。伊朗意识到核武器将是实现这些战略目标的有力手段，而与此同时，以色列将伊朗核项目视为致命的安全威胁。如伊朗借机寻求研制核武器，很可能令以色列冒险对伊朗核设施进行军事打击。

美国减少在中东的军事存在将缓解基地组织开展恐怖活动的困难。从巴基斯坦到摩洛哥之间所有阿拉伯国家都将面临基地组织和其他极端组织发动的暴力恐怖袭击行动。

（三）地区伊斯兰大国加紧争夺势力范围

冷战结束后，中东地区的四个伊斯兰大国是埃及、土耳其、沙特、伊朗，其中埃及一直是中东的首要大国。然而这次地区政治危机改变了原先的格局。埃及因国内动乱而使自己的地区影响力大幅度下降，沙特则因失去埃及这一重要盟友使其影响力受到削弱。相形之下，土耳其和伊朗的地区影响力相对上升。土耳其将主要影响那些有意进行政治改革的国家，而伊朗则会影响宗教激进势力上升的国家。

埃及、土耳其、沙特、伊朗四国的战略关系有可能发生改变。埃及很可能效仿土耳其进行政治改革，两国在内政和外交政策的相似性有可能增强他们的战略合作关系，以压制沙特和伊朗在该地区的影响力。沙特因为担心埃及的改革影响到海湾君主制国家，因此会疏远与埃及的关系，双方原先的良好战略关系将因此受到影响。伊朗和沙特因宗教分歧长期以来互有戒心。伊朗有意利用此次危机支持什叶派势力的壮大，这将与沙特支持的逊尼派势力发生更多的争夺。当年美国发动的阿富汗和伊拉克战争，客观上帮伊朗清除了东西两大凤敌，使伊朗地缘环境获得改善。这次阿拉伯亲美国家自乱阵脚，使中东亲美温和势力严重受挫，反美激进势力则得以增长，伊朗可借机引导地区局势朝"伊斯兰化"和"什叶化"方向发展，海湾地区有可能成为伊朗的扩张重点。

以色列将因此次中东政治危机而在战略上受损。一方面，以色列周边国家的强烈反以势力正在上升，而宿敌伊朗在这些国家的影响力也在上升。另一方面，以色列还失去了埃及和土耳其两个穆斯林盟友。穆巴拉克的下台使以色列失去了最可靠和最强大的阿拉伯朋友。埃及国内出现的修改《戴维营协议》、交好伊朗、斡旋巴勒斯坦两派的种种势头，使以色列安全环境恶化的噩梦成真。去年，以色列因阻止土耳其救援船前往加沙而与土耳其闹翻。土政府不仅停止以空军在土领空的训练，还首次将以色列列为"主要威胁"。总之，无论将来伊斯兰大国之间出现何种矛盾，以色列都将面临日益困难的地区环境。

（四）西方大国中东影响力呈下降趋势

美国仍将是对中东最有影响力的区域外国家，但其对中东的主导力已呈现下降之势。奥巴马无意在中东有所作为是美国在中东影响力下降的主要原因。目前，美国介入利比亚战争既难以阻止其在该地区主导地位的衰落，也难以给欧洲大国提供填补政治真空的机会。今年5月19日奥巴马发表的中东政策表明，其政策目标是减缓美国在中东主导地位的衰落速度，而不是增强或保持在中东现有的主导地位，为此美国的政策原则是"多说少做"，即口头上坚决支持中东国家的政治变革，但不会向这些国家提供更多的物质支持，减少而不是增加在该地区的军事存在和经济援助。为了减少国内的政治压力，奥巴马还要减少在阿富汗、伊拉克和利比亚三场战争中的军事投入。

此外，客观的地缘政治环境变化也使美国的主导力下降。一是在以色列失去阿拉伯盟友并陷于孤立后，美国对以色列的支持将更严重地损害其与阿拉伯国家的关系。奥巴马在5月讲话中呼吁以色列和巴勒斯坦以1967年的边界线为基础展开谈判，三天后又因以色列的强烈反对而改口说谈判结果必然与当年的边界不一样，结果又遭到阿拉伯国家的批评。二是中东国家的反伊朗阵营弱化，美国遏制伊朗的难度增加。美国一方面想阻止伊朗的核计划，另一方面又不愿以色列与伊朗发生军事冲突。美国在中东已经没有可以拓展战略利益的选择，而只有减少战略损失的选择。

虽然法、英、意积极参加利比亚战争，然而由于三国的全球影响力呈下降趋势，因此它们无力填补美国战略收缩后产生的权力真空。可以预见，只要美军一退出利比亚战争，北约绝无力量维持有效的空袭。北约空袭利比亚已经三个多月，正在形成拉锯战和消耗战，造成的平民伤亡越来越多。如果这场战争拖到年底还无结果，北约就可能选择放弃，不再追求利比亚实现民主化的目标，而会转向支持班加西反对派独立。北约发动科索沃战争时也曾说不支持科索沃独立，但结果是自食其言。

中东的政治动荡短期内难以结束，而美国对该地区的影响力将呈下降趋势，欧洲国家则无力填补美国影响力下降所产生的真空，其他地区的大国也无意介入中东事务，因此中东地区大国的影响力会明显上升，中东政治将更加本地化。

四、构建中东和平的路径

根据以上分析，本报告认为，当务之急是应对战争和军事冲突问题而不是发展问题，即如何停止现有的战争和军事冲突，避免新的战争和军事冲突的发生，防止恐怖暴力活动向外扩散。本报告在先防止冲突扩散和升级而后加以解决的原则下，提出一些实现中东和平和防止暴力扩散的政策建议。

首先，支持西亚北非国家依据本国实际情况进行政治改革，减少因政治危机而产生的社会暴力冲突。国际

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社会不宜为西亚北非国家制定统一的改革方案和标准。虽然该地区多数国家最大的共同点是均为伊斯兰国家，但各国的宗教派别、经济水平和政治体制都不同。因此，国际社会不应以统一的外部标准来衡量具体国家的改革是否合理。依据外部标准做出的判断不但难以符合实际情况，而且容易产生误导。在此次危机中，君主制国家的动荡程度反而小于共和制国家，说明只从形式上效仿西方的政治制度并不能实现真正的政治转型。

中国既要支持该地区国家民众的改革要求，也要支持该地区国家政府独特的改革方案。中国应坚持，外部势力对西亚北非危机的介入应有利于消除战争和防止军事冲突发生的原则，外部势力对地区和解进程的参与应坚持多边主义原则，特别要坚持国际组织授权的原则，以保证介入行动的合法性。鉴于中国在中东各派冲突中没有派别倾向，因此中国可利用这一中立地位，单独在冲突双方之间进行调解和斡旋，促进和解的达成。鉴于该地区政权更迭的频率有上升之势，因此中国的中东政策有必要在不同党派之间保持平衡。

其次，由联合国派出维和部队，促使利比亚战争双方停火。目前，北约的军事行动已经远远超过联合国在利比亚建立禁飞区决定的内容。如果北约不出动地面部队，这场战争会有长期化的危险。为了尽快结束战争，联合国应当通过新的决议，向利比亚派遣维和部队，隔离战争双方，以最终实现停火。也门政府与反对派之间的军事冲突规模尚小，及时向也门派驻维和部队，有助于冲突双方较快实现停火。

> **由联合国派出维和部队，促使利比亚战争双方停火。**

中国应积极促使联合国就利比亚和也门两国军事冲突双方的停火问题达成决议。以往阿盟和非盟都不支持外部军事力量介入本地区事务，然而在此次危机中，这两个国际组织转而同意外部军事力量的介入。中国作为发展中国家的最重要代表，应在这场危机中体现出维护发展中国家和平的作用。除了积极促使联合国派出维和部队外，还应加强与阿盟和非盟等地区组织的协调。对于在地区多边机制框架下的促和行动亦应给予支持。如果阿盟和非盟需要，中国应积极参加它们的促和斡旋活动，发挥发展中大国的作用。

再次，限制对西亚北非地区冲突各方军事行动的物质支持，防止战争规模升级。除利比亚和也门外，该地区其他一些国家也有爆发军事冲突的危险。从二战后的中东历史来看，区域外国家为该地区国家军事行动提供

> **限制对西亚北非地区冲突各方军事行动的物质支持，防止战争规模升级。**

的支持均只能促进冲突升级，而无法根除或减缓冲突。因此，联合国应出台新的决议，禁止向中东北非地区冲突各方提供与军事行动相关的物质支持，而只能提供人道主义援助和经济建设所需要的援助。

中国坚持的不干涉内政原则适用于当前的中东北非危机。在不介入军事冲突的前提下，中国应促使联合国通过禁止外国向军事冲突方提供军事援助的决议，同时为了维护中国在该地区的政治经济利益，应考虑向有关国家提供人道主义援助。该地区民众非常肯定我国改革开放的成就和经验，因此我国可协助其进行经济改革和建设，并为此加大对阿拉伯国家官员的培训，提高他们

进行改革和建设的组织管理能力。

第四，消除反恐双重标准，降低中东恐怖主义势力扩散的危险。伴随阿拉伯国家的政权危机，美国在中东主导地位的衰落，特别是随着美国在该地区军事存在的减少，恐怖主义势力有回潮的可能性。为了避免这一局面的出现，国际社会应加大反恐合作力度。然而，国际社会目前无法就恐怖主义达成共同的定义，从而阻碍了各国在反恐问题上形成合力。特别是西方国家在国际反恐合作中采取双重标准，使得国际上出现了越反越恐的现象。目前西方国家在中东政治危机中的多重标准将会进一步增加仇恨和敌对，不利于国际反恐合作。有鉴于此，国际反恐合作亟需树立无歧视性原则，消除双重标准达成统一的"恐怖主义"定义，这是防止中东恐怖主义势力向外扩散的重要任务。

中国在消除国际反恐双重标准方面可发挥积极作用。中国长期反对国际反恐中奉行双重标准的作法得到了伊斯兰国家的普遍肯定。恐怖主义是宗教极端势力采取的一种斗争策略。由于中国是个无神论国家，对宗教的理解深度远不如中东国家，因此中国有必要与中东国家加强合作，与各派力量广泛接触，在各种力量之间保持不偏不倚的立场，加深对宗教极端势力的认识，从而在政治上防止宗教极端势力的扩展。

总之，本报告认为，中东政治危机有引发更长时期政治动荡的危险，因此国际社会应加强合作，促使有关国家停火，避免爆发新的武装冲突，防止恐怖主义出现新的扩散。

Highlights ...

◆ The present widespread regime crisis in countries in West Asia and North Africa is similar in many aspects to that in East Europe in the late 1980s. Both happened unexpectedly in countries with similar political systems, set off a chain reaction, and the rapid involvement of foreign forces triggered military conflicts. What distinguishes the regime crisis in the Arab world from that in East Europe are the different processes and consequences that Arab countries now face.

◆ The long-term factor responsible for the regime crisis in Arab countries is the transition in the basis of regime legitimacy from monarchical power to democratic rights. The immediate factor is declining U.S. domination in the Middle East. After the end of the Cold War, improved relations among Arab countries and the U.S. and Israel led to increasing dependence on U.S. support for the legitimacy of regimes in Arab countries. This support engendered liberal democratic thought, gradually weakened the role of Islam doctrine as the basis of regime legitimacy. The financial crisis in 2008 and the Obama administration's decision to pull its troops out of Iraq in 2010 enfeebled U.S. support for its Arab allies. The decline of U.S. domination hence broke the pillars that had hitherto prevented a domino regime crisis.

◆ This report predicts that turmoil in the Middle East will persist for a long period to come, that regional military conflicts are most likely to increase and escalate, that major Middle East powers will contend for more influence locally, and that the influence of Western powers on the Middle East will continue to decline. It proposes that dealing with war and military conflict in the Middle East, namely, deciding how to stop present wars and military conflict, avoid new ones and prevent the outward spread of terrorist activities, takes priority over development issues.

◆ This report entails support for West Asian and North African countries in carrying out political reforms according to their respective conditions, with a view of reducing social violence and conflicts arising from the political crisis. The United Nations should send in peacekeeping forces to bring about a ceasefire between conflicting sides. Material support to all sides of the conflict for military action in West Asia and North Africa should be restricted, with a view to preventing escalation of the scale of war. To lower the risk of the spread of terrorism throughout the Middle East, present double standards on anti-terrorism should be removed.

Toward A Peaceful Middle East

The death in early 2011 of an unemployed Tunisian who set fire to himself sparked the collapse of the Tunisian government. Shortly afterward the Arab world experienced a domino-like regime crisis, with Libya and Yemen plunge into wars or military conflicts. International organizations, such as the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the African Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the NATO, and the International Criminal Court, all became involved in this regional crisis, and Western countries such as the U.S., France, the UK and Italy actively participated in the Libyan war. There is no sign of an end to political turmoil in the Middle East, it has, on the contrary, intensified, and bode even more outbreaks of war. Although cooperation, harmony and development remain political hopes in the Middle East, determining a way of stopping war and military conflicts and thus achieving peace is now the most realistic objective. To avoid new military conflicts and put an end to unremitting war, it is important to understand the origins of the ongoing Middle East crisis, to estimate the trends of change, and to find strategies that will lead to peace in the region.

Regime Crisis in Arab Countries and Related Interpretations

The Characteristics and Types of Crisis

The present widespread regime crisis in countries in West Asia and North Africa is similar in many aspects to that which happened in East Europe in the late 1980s. Both happened unexpectedly in countries with similar political systems, set off a chain reaction, and the rapid involvement of foreign forces triggered military conflicts. What's distinguishes the regime crisis in the Arab world from that in the Eastern Europe are the different processes and consequences that Arab countries now face. Taking into account the status quo, countries involved the crisis can be roughly divided into three groups.

The first group comprises countries that have already undergone regime change, including Tunisia and Egypt. In Tunisia, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali was forced to step down on January 14, 2011 after his reign of the country for 23 years. In Egypt, Muhammad Hosni Sayyid Mubarak, who had ruled for 32 consecutive years, was on February 11, 2011, after 18 days of angry protests that constituted the Egyptian revolution, also forced to relinquish power. The establishment of new regimes

in these countries did not end political turmoil. Instead of showing positive support, the people were dissatisfied with measures against the previous ruling bloc, and demanded harsher punishment. They also displayed strong discontent with the new regimes' inability to remedy high unemployment and high inflation. Lacking authority, the new governments were patently unable to restore the social order. The tremendous passion of the people now buoys their attempts to change their regimes through protests and demonstrations, which indeed continue in Tunisia and Egypt.

The second group comprises countries where there has been no regime change but worsening crises, such as Libya, now at war, Yemen and Syria. The United Nations adopted on March 19 a resolution establishing a non-fly zone in Libya. With air support from Western countries, the anti-Gaddafi forces started an all-out war against the Libyan government. Because, however, NATO provided only air support and did not send in ground forces, both sides are engaged in a seesaw battle of attrition. In Yemen, despite strong public protests in January this year, President Ali Abdullah Saleh refused to hand over power. Armed conflict then broke out between the government and anti-government forces. After Saleh went to Saudi Arabia on June 3 to receive treatment for an injury, Vice President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi was appointed acting President of Yemen. The opposition declared that the government had already fallen from power, but the government said that the president would soon return to the country after his recovery. The "Base" branch of the Arabian Peninsula occupied Jin Ji Baer, capital of the Yemeni province of Abyan, and alleged it to be the capital of the Islamic Emirate it had founded. On March 18, large-scale demonstration also took place across Syria. The Bashar government forcibly suppressed the protesters, causing hundreds of deaths. Syria has been at the vanguard combating Israel in the Middle East, and is Iran's most important ally in West Asia and North Africa. Both the U.S. and Europe have imposed sanctions against Syria in support of anti-government forces, demanding that Bashar to step down.

The third group consists of countries in which anti-government forces have been developing but where the government retains control over the state order. In Bahrain, Shia Muslims, who constitute the majority of the population, are intent on toppling the ruling Sunni royal family. Anti-government demonstrations in Algeria demanded the resignation of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, and the Jordanian opposition called for Prime Minister Samir Rifai to step down. In Morocco, opposition figures have demanded decentralization of the executive government headed by King Mohammed VI, and eradication of government corruption. There have also been anti-government protests in Saudi Arabia, Oman, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, Kuwait and Lebanon. But the anti-government forces in these countries are not strong enough to overthrow their respective governments. Member country governments of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) headed by Saudi Arabian support one other and join hands in suppressing such anti-government movements. On March 14, supported by GCC, King of Bahrain, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, declared a three-month state of emergency, and brought in 1,000 soldiers from Saudi Arabian and 500 police from the

United Arab Emirates to put down rebellions. The GCC military action gained support from the U.S. and other Western countries. Western leaders, however, do not mention the names of GCC states in their speeches about the present situation in the Middle East.

Existing Explanations

The media mainly blames the present regime crisis in Arab countries on "dictatorship", "economic backwardness", "polarization", and "online instigation." Though reasonable to a certain degree, these theories cannot explain why these political crisis occurred within such a concentrated space of time, nor why those in monarchies were of a smaller magnitude than in republics and possible to constrain.

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The "dictatorship" theory attributes the regime crises in West Asia and North Africa to their not having adopted Western democracy. Those holding this view are generally liberal theorist. Although phenomena such as lifelong rule, absolute monarchy and hereditary reigns are indeed prevalent in these countries, the theory still cannot explain certain facts: (1) The political systems of these countries, in force since their founding, have been relatively stable over past decades. Leaders of countries in West Asia and North Africa were hence able to preserve their rule amid the wave of democratization that toppled the regimes of East European countries. It was not until 2010 that regimes in the region came under threat and state leaders were forced to step down. (2) Among the countries involved in the crisis, Tunisia, first in the region to undergo a regime change, was relatively clear and bright, politically having gained a 32nd world ranking with regards to its degree of democracy, and a higher placing than Italy for its integrity. (3) Republics suffered more than the monarchies during the regime crisis. The Gulf monarchies, considered the most dictatorial, controlled the situation and were able to save their regimes, in contrast to the fall of republics such as Tunisia. The Western democracy-based blame on dictatorship for the widespread crisis in West Asia and North Africa, therefore, is less than persuasive.

The "economic backwardness" theory attributes the regime crises in West Asian and North African countries to their failure properly to manage economy and provide their peoples with adequate social security. Most holding this view are either economists or engaged in economic re-

search. This economic determinism argument does not accord with the facts of the matter. Most countries now experiencing crises are oil exporting countries, where the per capita GDP is far higher than that in emerging economies. Both Libya and Bahrain are high-income countries: almost all of their citizens engage in non-physical labour, and their overall social welfare standard are much higher than those in emerging economies. Tunisia ranks first in Africa and 40th in the world in economic competitiveness and 29th in the world in gross national happiness. Egypt was among the global top 10 reformers in 2008, and ranks 26th among 178 countries, after the United Arab Emirates and Israel in the Middle East. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, Egypt's economic growth rate, which had been 7% between 2006 and 2008, was 3% in 2009 and 5.8% in 2010. The view that attributes the regime crisis in the Middle East countries to economic backwardness is hence both weak in elucidation and largely inconsistent with the facts.

The "polarization" theory argues that public discontent with governments due to overt government corruption and social polarization caused the regime crisis in West Asian and North African countries. This explanation is common among advocates of socialist policy. That 5% of the population dominates 80% of the wealth in West Asia and North Africa is an objective fact in the region. Corruption and polarization are by no means new, having existed throughout history, and public discontent in these respects is not a process of gradual accumulation. People in the region have resented government corruption and social polarization since the end of colonial rule. Those at the bottom of the social scale have always believed that they never received the benefits of national independence that they deserved. Yet over past decades, such discontent with government corruption and social polarization has never culminated in a political appeal against lifelong rule, most changes of the regime occurred through coups, rather than through mass revolution. It is thus evident that the argument based on government corruption and social polarization also lacks effective persuasion.

The "network instigation" theory attributes modern communication technologies, such as mobile phones, Facebook and microblogging, to the present regime crisis in West Asian and North African countries. Wikileaks laid bare the oversea description of Ben Ali's government as the "mafia", and news of Tunisian unemployed graduate Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation spread rapidly through the Internet. Facebook and microblogging also greatly facilitated anti-government forces in communicating, organizing, mobilizing and liaising internally and externally in efforts to overthrow Mubarak. Although popular among the youth and IT professionals, this explanation has flaws. It does not explain why such means of communication played no role in sparking a regime crisis two years earlier, or in other regions. Mobile phones and the Internet are merely modern tools that carry and spread information, and as such exist worldwide, including dictatorial countries in other regions. The present regime crisis concentrated in the West Asia and North Africa region, makes evident that the "network instigation" theory does not explain it.

The majority of commentators consider the crisis to be a combined result of several of the above mentioned factors. This combined analysis approach is popular among dialecticians. They acknowledge that no single one of the above factors suffices to explain why these Arab countries have experienced a regime crisis in 2011 as a collective, but when these factors are put together, they do indeed explain the crisis. Within this line of thought, the combined action of the above factors did not work before 2011 simply because their comprehensive force was not powerful enough. According to the dialectic principle, the quantitative change leads to qualitative change, this group of commentators believe that it was not until 2011 that a great enough force had amassed. This explanation appears more persuasive than those earlier mentioned, but it has a severe flaw: it does not give the criterion for qualitative change, which makes the explanation tautological. Not knowing under what conditions qualitative change happens means that qualitative change can only be perceived as whether or not things happen. Such analysis, therefore, still cannot tell us why the regime crisis in 2011 happened to Arab countries in a collective way.

Diminished American Support

Having established that the above explanations are less persuasive in elucidating the present regime crisis across the Arab countries, we need to raise an analysis in a way that combines both the long-standing factor and the immediate catalytic factor leading to the crisis. This report holds that the long-term factor responsible for the regime crisis in Arab countries is the transition in the basis of regime legitimacy from monarchical power to democratic rights,

The long-term factor responsible for the regime crisis in Arab countries is the transition in the basis of regime legitimacy from monarchical power to democratic rights, and that the immediate factor is the decline of U.S. domination in the Middle East. After the end of the Cold War, improved relations Among Arab countries and the U.S. and Israel led to increasing dependence on U.S. support for the legitimacy of regimes in Arab countries. This support engendered liberal democratic thought, which gradually undermined the Muslim doctrine as the basis of regime legitimacy. The financial crisis in 2008 and the Obama administration's decision to pull its troops out of Iraq in 2010 enfeebled U.S. support for its Arab allies. The decline of U.S. domination hence broke the pillars that had hitherto prevented a domino regime crisis.

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regime legitimacy. The financial crisis in 2008 and the Obama administration's decision to pull its troops out of Iraq in 2010 enfeebled U.S. support for its Arab allies. The decline of U.S. domination hence broke the pillars that had hitherto prevented a domino regime crisis.

Weakened Legitimacy of Arab Regimes

The ideological trend of democratization after the end of the Cold War weakened the legitimacy of Arab regimes. Arab youth's awareness of citizenship gradually grew, and the concept of popular sovereignty came into vogue. Public awareness of popular sovereignty drove the shift in legitimacy of Arab regimes towards social development and progress. Such shift diminished the role in regime legitimacy of the traditional monarchical supremacy and nationalism centered on state sovereignty.

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First, the post-Cold War fall in external security threat weakened regime legitimacy in Arab countries. During the Cold War, the primary threat to sovereignty confronting Arab countries came from the West and Israel. It was for this reason that, in 30 or more years from 1948 to 1982, Arab countries fought five wars with Israel. Maintaining national security and sovereignty thus became an important base for regime legitimacy in Arab countries. As external security threats curbed social conflicts within Arab countries, the public, by and large, supported their home governments. The 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel sparked extensive criticism in the Arab world, but after the end of the Cold War, more and more Arab countries began to follow Egypt's suit by abandoning their policy against the U.S. and Israel. Even Muammar Gaddafi, who had persistently opposed the U.S., gave up his country's nuclear program in 2004, which improved relations with the U.S. Better relations among Arab countries and the U.S. and Israel have led to the shift in the basis of regime legitimacy in many Arab countries from maintaining state sovereignty to seeking social development.

Second, the change of social ideology also weakened the original legitimacy of the original regimes in Arab countries, which are mainly divided into two types, monarchies and republics. The ideological legitimacy of monarchies stems from the history of Islam and royal families, while that of republics is built on Islam and nationalism. After the Cold War, the global trend of democratization produced tremendous impact on the ideology of the youth in Arab countries, which coupled with the growth in population as from the 1980s, led to a situation in which Western democratic thought stood equal to Islam. There was hence rapid development of consciousness of Western democ-

racy in Arab republics with so-called democratic and electoral systems. Arab monarchies, however, never considered giving up the scepter, which led to the slower growth therein of consciousness of Western democratic. This is one of the main reasons why anti-government forces in republics are stronger than in monarchies.

In the face of the two weakened bases of regime legitimacy – state security and ideology, Arab countries had to compensate by resorting to social development. In most Arab countries, however, regardless how high or low their economic level, there is serious polarization and official corruption. It is estimated that ruling blocs have lined their pockets with tens of billions of dollars. In Tunisia, according to Wikileaks, anything the Ben Ali family took a fancy to, whether cash, land, buildings or even a yacht, they acquired. The family's total assets reached £3.5 billion. There are reports that Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi's eight sons and one daughter, who had shares in oil, gas, hotels, media, distribution, communications, infrastructure etc., kept Libya's economic arteries under their control. Assets of the family of former President of Egypt Mubarak reportedly amounted to $40 billion to $70 billion.

Since the 1980s, Arab countries have had the world's highest birth rates, with 60 percent of the population below 25 years old. The youth have been prone to accepting new thoughts and new things, and the post-Cold War trend of democratization led them to develop Western values and incline towards liberal democracy. Even when living under good material conditions, they still made strong desire for social reform, one that becomes stronger in the case of those unemployed. In Egypt, the youth, who constitute 70 percent of the population, face likely unemployment. Even those who have received higher education are unlikely to find jobs. In Algeria, three-quarters of the population are below the age of 30, and the national unemployment rate is as high as 25 percent. Jordan has a jobless rate of 14 percent. According to 2011 International Labour Organization (ILO) data, the Middle East and North Africa have the highest jobless rates among the youth, both around 24 percent, and there are likely three times as many jobless youth than mature citizens.

Although the government of republics claim to practice democracy and fair elections, they in fact aspire to the original system of rule, to the point of creating family regimes. In other words, these countries were monarchies in disguise. Both Egyptian President Mubarak and Yemeni President Saleh ruled for more than 30 years, and Libyan leader Gaddafi has been in power for 41 years. All intended their sons to succeed them. Such behavior hones anti-government sentiments among the public.

Pro-U.S. policy has weakened regime legitimacy in Arab countries. Most, over the past few years, have given top priority to strengthening their relations with the West, especially the U.S.. But this policy has aroused strong Muslim antipathy. The West has since 1990 fought five large-scale

wars (the Gulf War, the Kosovo War, the War in Afghanistan, the Iraq War, and the Libyan War of 2011), four of them in the Muslim world and three towards Arab countries. Since the September 11 attacks, the U.S. War on Terrorism appears to be a way of targeting Muslims as terrorists, which has enormously aggravated Muslims' antipathy towards the U.S. and caused discontent with their home governments' pro-U.S. policy.

Pro-U.S. foreign policy made it difficult for Arab countries to deal with the security threat from Israel, which also led to grave discontent among the public. In 2006, Israel invaded Lebanon after Hezbollah captured several Israeli soldiers; at the end of 2008, Israel once again launched a large-scale military campaign titled Operation Cast Lead, against the Gaza Strip, in response to the Hamas launch of rockets. Pro-West governments displayed a feeble attitude towards these events, some of whose response did not measure up even to that NATO member state of Turkey. The peoples in Arab countries were keenly aware of their countries' loss of dignity and national pride, which added fuel to growing discontent with their governments.

Such serious inadequacy in regime legitimacy turns everyone outside of the ruling bloc and those with vested interests into the opposition. The poor despise the rich for living a life of luxury, the populace is opposed to dignitaries for their taking advantage of the public interest, priests feel antipathy towards secularization, and democrats criticize autocracy.

Weakened U.S. Dominant Position in the Middle East

Both the impact of the 2008 financial crisis and the U.S. decision to pull troops out of Iraq and Afghanistan weakened the dominant position of the U.S. in the Middle East. When the regime crisis hit Arab countries, the U.S. did not provide its traditional allies with economic and military support, and moreover blew hot and cold before finally giving support to anti-government forces. The U.S.'s inability to offer timely support to its allies in West Asia and North Africa led to the domino-like regime crisis in the entire region rather than one limited to an individual country.

The 2008 financial crisis was the worst economic crisis the U.S. experienced since World War II, and had enormous impact on its comprehensive strength. The U.S. national debt reached this year the ceiling fixed by the U.S. Congress, causing Congress to say no to the Obama administration's fiscal budget bill. The U.S. Federal Government has hence been prepared to close certain government organs. This crisis has also generated a persistently high rate of unemployment in the U.S., exerting enormous political and financial pressure on the Obama administration.

This economic crisis also enfeebled the international presence of the U.S. in the Middle East. First, economic hardship made the U.S. unable to provide needed economic support to Arab allies confronted with regime crisis. When speaking about the U.S. policy towards the Middle East in May this year, President Obama stressed trade and investment, rather than economic aid, as an appropriate form of support for democratic reforms in the Middle East. Second, it was economic hardship that strengthened the Obama administration's determination to pull its troops out of Afghanistan and Iraq. The decision to withdraw its troops as scheduled without having achieved the political goals of the Iraq war and the war in Afghanistan constituted a political signal that the U.S would be unable to provide its Arab allies with reliable military support. When regime crises struck Tunisia and Egypt early this year, the U.S. failed rapidly to send in warships; it was, on the contrary, Iran that was first to dispatch two warships there. Obama was resolute in refusal to dispatch ground troops to Libya, thus revealing that the U.S. was indeed unable to provide reliable military support to its allies in the Middle East.

Since the 2008 financial crisis and Obama's decision to withdraw troops from Iraq and Afghanistan indicate the U.S. has been following a strategic shrinkage policy in the Middle East. Such strategic shrinkage will inevitably give rise to changes in political ecology in the region. In the late 1980s, under the global trend of democratization, the Soviet Union's strategic shrinkage sparked regime change in East European countries. The Middle Eastern regimes were at the time also confronted with enormous external impact, but because the Middle East was within the sphere of influence of the U.S. – the biggest winner of the Cold War and thus able to provide its Middle East allies with adequate shelter and aid, they escaped the threat of regime replacement. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, however, the War in Afghanistan and the Iraq War became black holes consuming the national strength of the U.S. According to American economist Joseph Stiglitz et al., the Iraq War alone cost the U.S. three trillion dollars. After Obama came to power, an updated version of the "Nixon Doctrine" was promoted in the Middle East, with a strategic shrinkage trend at the fore. The decline in both strategic investment by the U.S. in the Middle East and its influence there led to ups and downs between pro- and anti-U.S. forces in the Middle East, along with growingly prominent potential contradictions.

Facing the situation in which pro-U.S. forces in the region were repeatedly impacted, the U.S.

seemed helpless, having no intention or capability of "filling the void" in time, and able to make nothing more than a passive response. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, "As we tried to offer some help and advice with regard to the situation (in Egypt), we found we were only an outsider watching what's happening there." Currently, the U.S. has a very confused attitude towards the political turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa. On the one hand, it hopes that the Middle East can step up democratic reforms as a means to divert and dissolve governmental pressure, and firm the foundation of pro-U.S. regimes, on the other, it fears that reforms in the region may go far as to enable anti-U.S. and anti-West forces to come into power. It is hence vacillating between "reform and stability." To reduce losses as far as possible, the U.S. has avoided standing together with losers and adopted a policy of multiple standards that "vary from country to country": it made every effort to ensure stability in Gulf oil producers such as Saudi Arabia, and tacitly consented to Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates jointly dispatching troops to Bahrain to suppress local protests; it encouraged public protests and political transition in North African countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, but made every effort to keep their process of reform acceptable to U.S. interests. In early 2011, Obama articulated in his State of the Union address U.S. support for Tunisian appeals for liberty and democracy, so implying suppression of reforms in other Arab countries. After the Egyptian riots took place, the U.S. encouraged the Egyptian military to depose Mubarak, just as young Egyptian officials had done to King Farouk. The U.S. fanned the flames among anti-U.S. countries like Libya and Syria, openly encouraged protesters, participated in air raids on Libya, and imposed sanctions on Syria. The U.S. practice of "multiple standards", in fact, further impaired the trust of both Arab people and their rulers in the U.S.

A More Turbulent Middle East

On the basis of above analysis, this report predicts that turmoil in the Middle East will persist for a long period to come, that regional military conflicts are most likely to increase and escalate, that major Middle East powers will contend for more influence locally, and that the influence of Western powers' on the Middle East will continue to decline.

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Persisting Regime Crisis in Arab Countries

The regime crisis in Arab countries will not lead to successful democratization in all related

countries, and probably produce three different results. Some countries will achieve non-Western democratization, as the Islamic culture's dominance precludes democratization in Arab countries being totally Western. This group will probably follow Turkey's lead in establishing a western-style secular government based on a military regime, with Islam remaining the main social ideology. Republics that have undergone regime replacement are likely to evolve towards this result. The second group of countries will institute certain social reforms on the premise of monarchial stability. GCC countries may fall under this group. The third group of countries is likely to experience long-term, war-inflicted chaos or civil strife. They might endure long-term civil strife, or each split into two countries, or suffer repeated military coups. Republics with severe contradictions between military factions are likely to incur this result.

All the three results, however, will further improve the role of armed forces in domestic politics. In the Arab world, armed forces are highly structured, hierarchically blurry blocs and thus eminently suitable to act as arbitrators of political disputes and even as wire-pullers. Since its founding as a republic in 1952, three presidents of Egypt (Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak) have risen from the military. Egypt's political transition today is still directed by the military. In the next two to three years, Arab countries – no matter whether their regimes have been replaced or remain unchanged, have to stage social reforms, in the process of which there will inevitably be many aspects that the public will find unsatisfactory. Most Arab countries, therefore, will face the problem of regime stability. In order to maintain social stability, Arab countries will have to employ armed forces to maintain order and mediate interest disputes. By maneuvering behind the scenes, armed forces in certain countries are likely to come to the fore.

Islamic organizations will be more vigorous. In most Arab countries, there is no political opposition in the modern sense, but there are quite vigorous Islamic organizations of various types. The Islamic forces, which enjoy great popularity among the middle and lower classes, have distinct ideologies, high degrees of organization, and relatively sound social aid and welfare systems. The recent crisis in the Middle East and North Africa impaired rulers' control over Islamic organizations, giving the latter much more room for activity. Tunisia's Islamist party was legalized and Egypt released the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and his followers after years of imprisonment. Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood founded the Freedom and Justice Party to contest seats in the upcoming parliamentary election, and called for Arab countries to follow Iran's political model. The crisis in the Middle East and North Africa is likely to spread from North Africa to neighboring countries in the south as most of them are also Islamic countries with similar politics and religion to those in North Africa.

Increasing Regional Military Conflicts

After the Cold War, West Asia and North Africa region overtook both the part of Africa south of Sahara and Latin America to become the region of the world with most wars and military conflicts. Drawing on lessons learned from the Iraq war and the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. and NATO adopted the strategy of conducting air strikes only on Libya and not dispatching ground troops there. This could only prolong the war, rather than increase the ability to end it. If the U.S. withdraw its troops step by step from Afghanistan, it will mean prolongation of the war there. At the same time, the U.S.' withdrawal of troops will relieve military pressure on al-Qaeda and thus give rein to its violence in West Asia and North Africa. With NATO sending in no ground troops, the Libyan war is long likely to persist. NATO has already recognized this point, announcing as of June 1, another round of 90-day bombing. Libya's civil war is most likely to be prolonged, whether or not Gaddafi quits his ruling. If Gaddafi were to step down, the struggles among Libyan tribes would grow into military conflict; if Gaddafi and the opposition reached a partition agreement, military conflicts between both sides would not totally end either. Military conflicts in Yemen did not weaken after President Saleh was injured in an attack, but instead, escalated.

In addition to the ongoing wars, new military conflicts are threatening the region, Israel and Iran being two main flashpoints. As Israel always seeks absolute security, changes in regional strategic relations are likely to give rise to a new round of military conflicts between Palestine and Israel. On June 5, Israeli forces fired at Syrian protesters as they approached the frontier with the Golan Heights, leaving at least 13 protesters dead and more than 100 wounded. The new government of Egypt altered its policy towards Israel by befriending Hamas, which strengthened Palestine's anti-Israel forces. Israel and Palestine's tit for tat policies are expanding possibilities of military conflicts between the two sides. The likelihood of military conflicts between Israel and Hezbollah are also increasing. Israel has invaded Lebanon twice, mainly targeting Hezbollah. Hezbollah is currently in power and has basically resumed its military strength. Facing the growing influence of Iran in the region, Israel intends to break the situation in which it is being besieged by Iran-supported radical forces, and is likely to attack Hezbollah once again.

Iran's nuclear issue is likely to spark military conflicts between Israel and Iran. The political turmoil in the Middle East further strengthened Iran's determination to develop nuclear weapons. Libya came under NATO's military strikes after abandoning its nuclear program, which convinced Iran that developing nuclear weapons is the fundamental guarantee of regime security. The regime crisis in the Arab countries provided Iran with the opportunity to broaden its regional influence and become a regional power. Iran realized that nuclear weapons would be the effective means through which to achieve these strategic objectives. Meanwhile, Israel views Iran's nuclear program as a deadly security threat. If Iran takes the opportunity to attempt development of nuclear

weapons, Israel is most likely to launch military attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities.

The U.S. reduction of its military presence in the Middle East will make it easier for al-Qaeda to carry out terrorist activities. All Arab countries, ranging from Pakistan to Morocco, hence face violent terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda and other extremist groups.

Bitter Competitions for Sphere of Influence among Regional Islamic Powers

Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran had, since the end of the Cold War, been four major Islamic powers in the Middle East, Egypt always ranked the top. But the recent regional political crisis has changed the previous pattern. Egypt's regional influence has been considerably impaired by domestic turmoil, and Saudi Arabia has seen a reduction in its influence by virtue of losing an important ally–Egypt. In contrast, the regional influence of Turkey and Iran has grown. Turkey will have influence primarily on those countries that intend carrying out political reforms, while Iran will influence countries where religious radical forces are on the rise.

Strategic relations between the four countries are likely to change. Egypt is most likely to follow the lead of Turkey in carrying out political reform, and the two countries' similarities with resect to domestic and foreign policy may strengthen their strategic partnership through which to constrain the influence of Saudi Arabia and Iran in the region. Fearing that Egypt's reform may affect monarchies in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia might weaken its relations with Egypt, which would result in the loss of their previous good strategic relations. Iran and Saudi Arabia have been wary of each other for years for reasons of religious divergence. Iran intends to take advantage of this crisis to support the strengthening of Shia forces, which suggests more conflicts with Saudi Arabia-supported Sunni forces. The war in Afghanistan and the Iraq war launched by the U.S. objectively helped Iran clear away two old enemies of its east and west, which improved Iran's geo-environment. This crisis, which left the pro-U.S. countries in the Arab world in disarray, severely frustrated the mild, pro-U. S. forces and fuelled the growth of anti-U.S. radical forces. Iran may take the opportunity to lead the regional situation toward a more Islamic and Shia direction, and the Gulf is likely to become the focus of its expansion.

Israel will suffer strategically from the political crisis in the Middle East. On the one hand, strong anti-Israel forces in countries neighboring Israel are swelling. Moreover, Israel's old enemy, Iran has a growing influence in these countries. On the other hand, Israel has also lost two of its Muslim allies, Egypt and Turkey. The fall of Mubarak means that Israel has lost its most reliable and powerful Arab friend. The appearance of the revised Camp David Accords in Egypt, and Israel's befriending Iran and mediating between the two Palestine fractions have made reality the nightmare of a worsening Israeli security environment. Last year, Israel fell out with Turkey over its assault on Turkey's

Gaza-bound aid fleet. The Turkish government stopped the Israeli air force's training in Turkish air space, and also listed Israel as a "major threat". In short, whatever contradiction there might be among the Islamic powers, Israel will face an increasingly harsh regional environment.

Declining Western Powers' Influence in the Middle East

The U.S. will remain the most influential foreign country outside of the Middle East, but its leadership in the region has hit a downward trend, mainly because Obama has no intention of achieving much in the region. Current U.S. involvement in the Libyan war can hardly stop the decline in its leadership in the region and it is difficult for European powers to take up the opportunity to fill the political vacuum. The Middle East policy speech which Obama gave on May 19 this year suggested that the U.S.' policy goal is to slow down the decline of its leadership in the Middle East, rather than strengthen and maintain its present position in the region. The U.S. policy principle is, therefore, "more talking, less doing", that is, resolutely support political reforms in the Middle East countries orally, but provide them with no more material support, so reducing – rather than increasing – its military presence and economic aid in the region.

The change of the objective geopolitical environment is also a dominant force in the decline of U.S. leadership in the Middle East. First, the U.S. support of Israel since the loss of its Arab allies and isolation would further impair U.S. relations with Arab countries. In his May speech, Obama called for Israel and Palestine to negotiate based on the 1967 border line. Three days later, in response to Israel's strong opposition, he corrected himself by saying that the result of negotiation was bound to be different from the previous borderline, once again drawing criticism from Arab countries. Second, the weakening of the anti-Iranian camp in the Middle East made it more difficult for the U.S. to contain Iran. On the one hand, the U.S. intends to stop Iran's nuclear program, but on the other is unwilling to get into military conflicts with Israel and Iran. The U.S. has had no option but to reduce strategic losses in the Middle East.

Though France, the UK and Italy have actively participated in the Libyan war, with the declining tendency of their global influence, they are unable to fill the power vacuum brought by the U.S.'s strategic shrinkage. It is foreseeable that NATO will be powerless to maintain effective air raids as long as U.S. troops withdraw from the Libyan war. NATO air strikes raids on Libya have lasted for more than three months, but have instead made of the conflict a seesaw war—a war of attrition, resulting in growing civilian casualties. If the war were to prolong to the end of the year with no result obtained, NATO might choose to give up and no longer seeking democratization in Libya, and turn to support Benghazi independence.

Political turmoil in the Middle East seems unlikely to end in the short term. As U.S. influence

in the region declines, European countries will be unable to fill the vacuum and powers in other regions have no intentions of getting involved in Middle East affair. The influence of other power in the Middle East, therefore, will grow significantly, and politics there will become more localized.

Path towards a Peaceful Middle East

Based on the above analysis, this report suggests that dealing with war and military conflict in the Middle East, avoid new ones and prevent the outward spread of terrorist activities, take priority over development issues. This report raises policy suggestions on how to achieve peace in the Middle East and prevent the spread of violence on the principle of first preventing the spread and escalation of conflicts and then solving them.

(1) International community should support West Asian and North African countries in carrying out political reforms in accordance to their respective conditions, with a view to reducing social violence and conflicts arising from the political crisis. It would not be appropriate for the international community to formulate a uniform reform scheme and standard for West Asian and North African countries. Although most countries in this region are Islamic, they differ with regards to sect, economic level and political structure. The international community, therefore, should not use an external standard to gauge whether or not reforms in a particular country are correct. Judgment made based on such an external standard is impracticable in reflecting real conditions, and, moreover, tends to be misleading. Throughout the present crisis, monarchies have experienced less turmoil than republics, which shows that following merely in form the Western political system cannot truly realize a political transition.

> **To support West Asian and North African countries in carrying out political reforms in accordance to their respective conditions, with a view to reducing social violence and conflicts arising from the political crisis.**

China should support the public demands for reform in countries in the region and also the reform schemes of each of their governments. China must insist that external forces' involvement in the West Asian and North African crisis has to be conducive to eliminating war and preventing military conflicts, and that external forces' participation in the process of regional reconciliation must adhere to the principle of multilateralism, especially authorization by international organizations so as to ensure the legitimacy of intervening actions. Given that China has no inclinations towards any particular faction in the Middle East, it can take advantage of its neutral position to mediate between the two sides of the conflict and use its good offices to bring about settlement. Given the upward trend of the frequency of regime replacement in the region, China's Middle East policy needs to maintain balance among different political parties and groups.

(2) The United Nations should send in peacekeeping forces to bring about a cease fire between both sides of the Libyan war. NATO's current military action has gone far beyond the United Nations' decision to impose a no-fly zone over Libya. To end the conflict as soon as possible, the United Nations should adopt a new resolution to dispatch peacekeeping forces to Libya to separate both sides of the war and achieve a ceasefire. Given the small-scale conflict between the Yemeni government and the opposition, sending peacekeeping forces there in good time will help both sides of the conflict to agree soon to a ceasefire.

China should press the United Nations to reach resolutions on ceasefires in the military conflicts in Libya and Yemen. In the past, the League of Arab States and the African Union have been against the involvement of external military forces in their regional affairs, but amid the present crisis, they have agreed to external military intervention. As the most important representative of developing countries, China should enact its role in the crisis of maintaining peace of developing countries. In addition to pressing the United Nations to send in peacekeeping forces, China should also strengthen coordination among regional organizations such as the League of Arab States and the African Union. If requested by the two organizations, China should become proactive in their mediatory efforts in its capacity as the largest developing power.

(3) Restrict material support for military action by all sides of conflict in the region of West Asia and North Africa, with a view of preventing war escalation. In addition to Libya and Yemen, there is also a risk of military conflicts breaking out in certain other countries of the region. From the perspective of post-Second World War Middle East history, support provided by countries outside the region for military operations simply escalated, rather than rooting out or mitigating conflicts. The United Nations, therefore, should map out a new resolution to provide only humanitarian aid and the assistance necessary for economic development, to all sides of conflicts in the region, rather than material support for military operations.

To restrict material support for military action by all sides of conflict in the region of West Asia and North Africa, with a view of preventing war escalation.

The principle of non-interference in internal affairs has always been upheld by China is appropriate amid the current crisis in the Middle East and North Africa. On the premise of non-involvement in military conflicts, China should press the United Nations to adopt a resolution that prohibits foreign countries from providing military aid to all sides of the military conflicts, and consider providing relevant countries with humanitarian aid for purposes of maintaining China's political and economic interests in the region. Given that China is highly regarded by peoples in the region for its reform and opening achievements and experience, China may assist them in carrying out economic

reforms and development, and also strengthen the training of officials in Arab countries in efforts to improve their management capacity and organizational efforts towards reform and development.

(4) International community should remove double standards on anti-terrorism to lower the risk of the spread of the Middle East terrorism. In view of the decline of U.S. leadership in the Middle East, and especially its diminishing military presence in the region, there is likely to be a resurgence of terrorist forces amid the present regime crisis in Arab countries. To prevent this, the international community should strengthen anti-terrorism cooperation. The international community, however, has failed to reach consensus on a common definition of terrorism. This hinders the formation of a concerted force in the fight against terrorism. Western countries' adoption of double standards in international anti-terrorism cooperation has moreover led to the international phenomenon of "more combat, more terror." The multiple standards applied by the Western countries in the present political crisis in the Middle East will increase hatred and hostility, and are hence not conducive to international cooperation against terrorism. There is, therefore, an urgent need to establish the non-discrimination principle within international anti-terrorism cooperation and to remove double standards, in order to reach a unified definition of terrorism. This is a vital task that must be accomplished to prevent the diffusion of terrorist forces in the Middle East.

> **To remove double standards on anti–terrorism to lower the risk of the spread of the Middle East terrorism.**

China can play an active role in removing double standards on international anti-terrorism. Islamic countries widely commend China for its persistent in opposition within international anti-terrorism to double standards. Terrorism is a type of combat strategy adopted by religious extremist forces. China, as an atheistic country, is far behind the Middle Eastern countries with regards to understanding religion, it thus needs to strengthen cooperation with those countries, to make extensive contact with the forces of various factions, maintain an impartial attitude towards various forces, and gain better knowledge of religious extremist forces, thereby preventing the political diffusion of these forces.

In the final analysis, this report holds that there is risk that the political crisis in the Middle East will spark persistent political turmoil. The international community, therefore, should strengthen cooperation towards urging relevant countries to cease fire, avoid new armed conflicts, and prevent the spread of terrorism.

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Toward A Peaceful Middle East

迈向一个和平的中东 Toward A Peaceful Middle East